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INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION:
PROMOTING PRO SE PARTIES’ INFORMED
SETTLEMENT CHOICE WHILE HONORING
THE MEDIATOR’S ETHICAL DUTIES
Michael T. Colatrella Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
An issue of increasing importance to both mediation policy
and practice is the extent of a mediator’s responsibility to ensure
that mediation participants who are not represented by legal coun-
sel make informed settlement choices.1  Mediators have certain du-
ties to promote informed decision making throughout the
mediation process, but the nature of these duties and how they
should be discharged is a topic of debate.2  Mediator ethical codes
provide minimal guidance on the issue, leaving unacceptable ambi-
guity as to the role the mediator plays in a participant’s informed
consent.  “Informed consent” is the legal term that describes the
circumstances under which a person knowingly and voluntarily
* Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law.  Relevant
to this Article’s topic, Professor Colatrella co-created and currently teaches in McGeorge’s Pris-
oner Civil Rights Mediation Clinic in which law students co-mediate section 1983 prisoner claims
with a federal magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California.  Prisoners are typically unrepresented in these cases.  The author also assisted in de-
signing, creating and co-teaching in Pacific McGeorge’s Housing Mediation Clinic in which stu-
dents mediate disputes between landlords and tenants in Sacramento, CA.  Through a
collaborative partnership with the Sacramento Superior Court and Northern California Legal
Aid, all qualifying Housing Clinic participants, usually tenants, are provided limited-assistance
attorneys who, at no charge, represent the participants for the purposes of mediation.  For help-
ful comments to early drafts of this Article, the author wishes to thank his wife, Jean Mary
Shanley, Esq., and his friend Thomas A. Cinti, Esq. The author also wishes to thank the sponsors
and participants of the 2013 AALS ADR Works-In-Progress Conference held at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law for their helpful comments to the ideas expressed in this Article.  For
their research assistance, he extends thanks to Sara Arfmann and Neil Cacali.  For additional
proofreading, thanks also go to Sara Puricelli.
1 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775 (1999); Beverly W. Snukals &
Glen H. Sturtevant, Jr., Pro Se Litigation: Best Practices from a Judge’s Perspective, 42 U. RICH
L. REV. 93, 94 (2007); Russell Engler, Revising the Role of the Court-Connected Mediator To
Achieve Fairness for Unrepresented Litigants, 11 NE-ACR NEWSLETTER 1 (2005).
2 Cynthia E. Nance, Unrepresented Parties in Mediation, 15 PRAC. LITIGATOR 47–48 n.3
(2004); Robert J. Niemic, Donna Stienstra & Randall E. Ravitz, Guide to Judicial Management
of Cases in ADR, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 24 (2001), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
ADRGuide.pdf/$file/ADRGuide.pdf.
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agrees to a course of action recommended by a professional, like a
physician or lawyer.3  This Article addresses whether and to what
degree the doctrine of informed consent should impose a duty on
the mediator to ensure that an unrepresented party to a mediation
“truly understands” the terms, benefits and risks of a contemplated
settlement.
Participant informed consent in mediation is a timely and im-
portant issue despite that surprisingly little has been written on the
topic.4  Increasingly, people are voluntarily turning to mediation to
resolve their disputes and are consequently impacted by mediation
policy.5  Many others are finding themselves forced involuntarily
into mediation, either by court order or economic constraints that
make litigation impractical or cost prohibitive.6  Studies show that
as high as 80% of parties in family disputes and as high as 90% of
tenants in landlord-tenant disputes are pro se.7  One study of fed-
eral courts showed that pro se cases constituted 37% of all cases
filed.8  The glut of pro se litigants is a relatively new and growing
problem.  For example, in California, in 1971, only 1% of divorce
3 Douglas Andrew Grimm, Informed Consent For All! No Exceptions, 37 N.M. L. REV. 39,
41 (2007).
4 ELLEN WALDMAN, MEDIATION ETHICS 113–54 (2011) (addressing the “tension between
the disputants autonomy and substantive fairness”); Engler, supra note 1, at 1 (advocating that
the mediator make pro se parties aware of rights waived by settlement); Lela P. Love & John W.
Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and Informed Consent: Warning the Un-
wary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45 (2005) (advocating that a mediator must warn parties of
the risks and benefits of evaluation); Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 775 (advocating for a robust
duty of informed consent for mediators); Niemic et al., supra note 2.
5 Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND.
L. REV. 103 (2001); Miles B. Farmer, Mandatory and Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbi-
tration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2372 (2012).
6 Jaqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration”, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61,
70 (2012) (stating that “mediation is the most frequently used process in both State and Federal
Courts.”); Joshua M. Frank, Stacked Deck: A Statistical Analysis of Forced Arbitration, CENTER
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 1–2 (May 31, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-cards/
research-analysis/stacked_deck.pdf.
7 Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including The Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the
Roles of the Judges, Mediators, And Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2048 (1999) (Stating that
“[t]he numbers of unrepresented litigants in family law cases have surged nationwide, with some
reports indicating eight percent or more of family law cases involve at least one pro se litigant.”);
Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations
with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1997) (Tenants in landlord-tenant court
typically fare no better, with reports in New York and Boston courts showing as high as 90% of
cases  having at least one pro se litigant.); Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate Balance:
Legal and Ethical Questions in Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 132 (1998)
(eighty-eight percent (88%) of litigants in Washington, D.C. family court represent themselves).
8 Tiffany Buxton, Note, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 103, 112 (2002).
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litigants were pro se.9  By 1985, that number grew to 47%, and to-
day, it approaches 80%.10  Moreover, both mediators and partici-
pants would benefit from greater clarity concerning the mediator’s
informed consent responsibilities because it will minimize the like-
lihood of a mediator committing an unwitting ethical violation.
Greater clarity concerning a mediator’s informed consent responsi-
bilities will also reduce incidents of participant dissatisfaction aris-
ing out of mismanaged expectations of the mediator’s role.
In arriving at a clearer understanding of the mediator’s role
regarding informed consent, it is important to explain at the outset
that the mediation scholarship distinguishes between two kinds of
informed consent: “participation” consent and “outcome” con-
sent.11  A party’s decision to take part in mediation is participation
consent.12  Participation consent encourages “a conscious, knowl-
edgeable decision to enter into the mediation process.”13  “Out-
come consent” addresses the degree to which a party understands
the agreement reached during the mediation process.14  Informed
outcome consent in this context means, not only, that the party
understands the settlement agreement’s terms and consequences,
but also what rights he or she will waive by settlement.15  Although
this Article’s main focus is on outcome consent, participation con-
sent is a vital component to enhancing outcome consent and will be
explored as well.
This Article concludes that the law should impose a duty on
mediators of informed participation consent, but not informed out-
come consent.  Requiring informed participation consent is consis-
tent with the mediator’s established role of educating parties about
the mediation process and empowering them to fully and know-
ingly engage in that process.  As we will see, participation consent
is also consistent with the mediator’s ethical obligations.  Imposing
the duty of informed outcome consent on the mediator would cre-
ate a significant conflict with the mediator’s ethical obligation of
impartiality.  It would also undermine the quality of the mediation
9 Bonnie Rose Hough, Description of California Court’s Programs for Self-Represented Liti-
gants (2003), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&
context=clrcircuit (data on the number of pro se litigants in California’s family law courts show-
ing that they have dramatically increased in the last twenty-five years).
10 Id.
11 Love et al., supra note 4 (explaining the different consent types and their effects).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 54.
14 Id.
15 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 775.
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process to such an extent that the process could no longer be aptly
labeled “mediation.”  These concerns notwithstanding, some medi-
ation scholars argue that when a pro se participant is ordered by
the court to attend mediation, the mediator must obtain informed
outcome consent—even if this means acting impartially, as that
concept is presently defined by most mediator ethical standards.
These scholars would require the mediator to explain legal rights,
raise unasserted legal claims, and assess the participant’s chance of
succeeding on those legal claims in court.16  In rejecting this view,
this Article will show that although mediators cannot guarantee in-
formed outcome consent, they nevertheless have the ability to sub-
stantially enhance informed outcome consent within their
appropriate and existing ethical duties.  Finally, it should also be
stated at the outset that this Article does not address the important
issue regarding whether pro se litigants should be required to medi-
ate their legal claims at all.  This Article addresses only the scope
of the mediator’s duty to promote informed decision-making
when pro se litigants participant in mediation voluntarily or
involuntarily.
In explaining the proper role of informed consent in media-
tion, this Article will proceed as follows: Part II will examine medi-
ation’s core ethical values of self-determination, impartiality and
promoting a quality process.  Part III will explore the meaning and
origins of the informed consent doctrine; and, in Part IV, analyze
the application of informed consent policies and principles to medi-
ation in the light of mediation’s core ethical values.  Part V will
explore ways that mediators can promote informed outcome con-
sent within the existing ethical framework and recommend legisla-
tive reform that will help clarify the mediator’s proper role of
promoting fair and informed agreements while honoring their eth-
ics and the integrity of the mediation process.  Finally, Part VI will
summarize the Articles’ important conclusions.
II. MEDIATION’S CORE VALUES AND MEDIATOR
ETHICAL DUTIES
To evaluate the proper role informed consent plays in the me-
diation process, it is essential to understand what mediation is and
the ethical context in which mediators function.  Although the
16 Id.
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practice of mediation has thus far resisted definition upon which all
can agree, most mediators would concur, as a general definition,
that mediation is a dispute resolution process where an impartial
person, the mediator, assists parties to a dispute to make better
decisions about the future of their dispute by conducting a fair and
balanced discussion focused on problem solving.17  Most mediators
would also agree that any reasonable definition of mediation, as
does the definition above, contemplates three immutable charac-
teristics: party self-determination, mediator impartiality and qual-
ity process.18  These characteristics are so central to the mediation
process that they have been codified in the Model Standard of
Conduct for Mediators (the “Model Standards”), which is the most
authoritative mediator ethical code in the United States.19
The Model Standards, the first mediator ethical code of na-
tional significance, was issued in 1994 by a joint committee of the
American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association
Section of Dispute Resolution and the Association of Conflict Res-
olution.20  These Model Standards have no official status, like other
model codes, but are nevertheless highly influential and serve as a
guide for most states’ mediation ethical rules.21  These ethical stan-
dards, which were revised and updated in 2005, still serve as the
most influential mediation ethical rules, even though, as will be dis-
cussed below, they have several significant shortcomings.22  These
17 See LAURENCE J. BOULLE, MICHAEL T. COLATRELLA JR. & ANTHONY P. PICCHIONI, ME-
DIATION- SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES 1 (2008); JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOVE, THE MID-
DLE VOICE 5 (2d ed. 2013); Susan Nauss Exon, The Effects That Mediator Styles Impose on
Neutrality and Impartiality Requirements of Mediation, 42 U.S.F. L. REV 577, 580 (2008) (ex-
plaining that most definitions of mediation “include key provisions, such as the mediator’s ability
to be neutral and impartial and the parties’ ability to negotiate a resolution of their own choos-
ing—party self determination”); Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Defini-
tion, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 70, 92 (2005) (describing the difficulty in arriving at a commonly
accepted definition of mediation).
18 DOUGLAS N. FRENKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 83 (2008)
(stating that self-determination, impartiality and neutrality are three fundamental norms);
MODEL STANDARDS (2005).
19 MODEL STANDARDS (2005).
20 Id.
21 Id.; Robert Rubinson, The New Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct and Mediation:
Perplexing Questions Answered and Perplexing Questions That Remain, 36 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 23
(2005).
22 Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 87, 113 (1997) (with attorneys and other professionals);
Andrea C. Yang, Ethics Codes for Mediator Conduct: Necessary but Still Insufficient, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1239 (2009) (since no state yet licenses mediators, mediator ethical rules
have not been a priority for most states, despite that all states employ mediation both in and out
of their courts); Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Media-
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shortcomings notwithstanding, the thoughtful, credible effort that
resulted in the Model Standards take on particular significance re-
garding informed consent, and it is with the Model Standards that
this Article will place its emphasis.  The Model Standards is a rela-
tively short document as ethical codes go, consisting of nine ethical
standards.23  Only three of these standards are relevant to our dis-
cussion of the role of informed consent in mediation, and, not sur-
prisingly, they parallel mediation’s core characteristics listed above.
These ethical standards are self-determination, impartiality, and
quality of the process. Each of these standards is explained in turn
below.24
A. Self-Determination
It is no accident that “self-determination” is the first ethical
principle listed in the Model Standards, as it is a “foundational
principle” of mediation.25  The Model Standards explain that a
“mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of
tive Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 928 (1997) (In
a survey done in 2006, only twenty-seven states had state-adopted mediation ethical codes, thir-
teen states had ethical codes passed by private mediation organizations and fourteen states had
no state-wide mediator ethical code at all.); Susan Nauss Exon, How Can A Mediator Be Both
Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP.
RESOL. 387, 395 (2006) (As might be imagined, there is significant variety across state codes); Id.
(There are also differences within states where professional organizations have passed compet-
ing visions of mediator ethics in the same jurisdiction.); ROBERT C. PRATHER, SR. & JOE L.
COPE, TEX. PRAC. GUIDE ADR § 12:22 (2012) (Even in states that have passed mediation ethi-
cal rules, through court rules or state statute, no state presently has an administrative enforce-
ment mechanism for addressing alleged ethical breaches by mediators.); Stephen G. Bullock &
Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing
Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L. REV. 885, 936 (1997) (Except for civil courts, where mediators
have been sued by participants under a theory of negligence or breach of contract, there is little
policing of mediator professional behavior.); Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide
for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2003) (Civil suits that occasionally result in pub-
lished decisions, provide what little guidance there is on how the broad principles espoused by
the law and ethical codes apply in specific circumstances.); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the
Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 479 (2000); Fiona Furlan et al., Ethical Guidelines for Attorney-
Mediators: Are Attorneys Bound by Ethical Codes for Lawyers When Acting As Mediators?, 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L.. 267 (1997).
23 MODEL STANDARDS (2005); Laura E. Weidner, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators
(2005), 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 547, 550 (2006).
24 MODEL STANDARDS (2005) (The other Model Standards are conflicts of interest, compe-
tence, confidentiality, advertising and solicitation, fees and other charges and advancement of
mediation practice.).
25 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 83.
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party self-determination.”26  The Model Standards defines self-de-
termination “as the act of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced deci-
sion in which each party makes free and informed choices as to the
process and outcome.”27  It is of note that the Model Standards
value a participant’s self-determination regarding both the media-
tion process as well as its outcome.28  Yet, the standard imposes no
affirmative duty on mediators to obtain informed consent in either
a participant’s decision to participate or in his decision to settle.  In
fact, the code explicitly states, later in the standard, that “[a] medi-
ator cannot personally ensure that each party has made free and
informed choices to reach particular decisions, but, where appro-
priate, a mediator should make the parties aware of the importance
of consulting other professionals to help them make informed
choices.”29  The term “informed choices” speaks directly to the
question of whether a mediator has a duty to ensure that a party’s
decision to accept a settlement is an informed one, and answers
that question with a “no.”  While the use of the term “informed
consent” might make a more resounding statement, the language
that a mediator has no obligation to “ensure that each party has
made a free and informed choices to reach particular decisions” is
clear enough.30
B. Impartiality
Mediator impartiality is the second immutable characteristic
of mediation and is defined as “freedom from favoritism, bias or
prejudice.”31  The re-drafters of the Model Standards in 2005 reaf-
26 MODEL STANDARDS  Standard I (2005).
27 Id.
28 Laura E. Weidner, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), 21 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 547, 556 (2006).
29 MODEL STANDARDS Standard IA(2) (2005) (some scholars note that term “informed
choices” as used in the code “does not have the force or clarity of a more explicit duty to obtain
informed consent”); Love et al., supra note 4, at n.18.
30 MODEL STANDARDS (the Model Standards temper unfettered party self-determination
even further with the mediator’s duty to maintain quality process.); Id. at I(A)(1) (The code says
that a mediator can “balance such party self determination with a mediator’s duty to conduct a
quality process . . . .”); Id. (What this means in practice, as we will see more fully below, is that a
mediator cannot permit party behavior to damage the efficacy of the mediation by undermining
“party participation, procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all par-
ticipants”); Id. at VI(A) (Thus, the mediator must balance a party’s desire to control the course
of the mediation with the need for a fair and effective process.).
31 Susan Nauss Exon, The Effects that Mediator Styles Impose on Neutrality and Impartiality
Requirements of Mediation, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 577, 583 (2008).
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firmed “the central role of the need for a mediator to be impar-
tial.”32  In defining mediator impartiality the Model Standards
state, in relevant part, that a “mediator shall conduct a mediation
in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives the appear-
ance of partiality.”33  Most relevant to our discussion, the Model
Standards explain that a “mediator should not act with partiality or
prejudice based on any participant’s personal characteristics, back-
ground, values and beliefs, or performance at a mediation, or for
any other reason.”34  States that have mediator ethical standards,
even though they can vary greatly on other ethical considerations,
all contain some form of impartiality.35  Some states define imparti-
ality with great care, while others merely denote that the mediator
must be “impartial,” without further clarification.36
A particularly important definitional issue to address is the
distinction between mediator impartiality and mediator neutrality.
These terms are often used interchangeably, but they have distinct
meanings within the mediation scholarship.37  As has been dis-
cussed, impartiality embodies even-handedness.38  Montana’s state
mediation standard nicely captures the spirit of impartiality when it
states that impartiality is “freedom from favoritism or bias either
by word or action, a commitment to serve all parties as opposed to
a single party.”39  Under this conception of impartiality, a media-
tor, many scholars agree, would be able to provide a legal opinion
to a participant as an evaluative technique to resolve the dispute as
long as she provided it in an objective manner.40  For instance, the
mediator might say to a tenant in a landlord-tenant dispute that she
has no legal basis to withhold rent given the particular circum-
stances of the dispute.  The mediator is being impartial because
even though she evaluated the merits of the dispute and has taken
a legal position that favors one party over another, she has applied
the relevant legal principles in an objective and unbiased way.41
This kind of evaluation, however, would not meet the requirements
32 MODEL STANDARDS Drafter’s Notes at 11.
33 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005).
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 Exon, supra note 22, at 397.
36 Id. at 387
37 Id. at 388.
38 Id. at 398.
39 MONT. MEDIATION ASS’N STANDARD PRACTICES (2003).
40 Susan Nauss Exon, How Can A Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Stan-
dards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 419 (2006).
41 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 835.
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of neutrality.42  Neutrality is characterized by not taking sides, not
just evenhandedness.43  To be neutral, the mediator cannot take
positions, however objective or impartial, against one party’s inter-
ests or try to persuade a participant to “relinquish her proposals on
some or all matters.”44  The functions of a neutral mediator are to
help the parties to “shape a rich dialogue among them and prod
them to explore and take responsibility for developing acceptable
ways to create a stable, functioning relationship.”45
While many mediators practice neutrality, most mediator ethi-
cal codes, including the Model Standards, only impose the less ex-
acting standard of impartiality on mediators.46  And it is
impartiality on which this Article will focus, not only because it is
the common standard found in mediation ethical codes, but also
because proposals to require informed outcome consent would not
even meet this lesser standard protecting mediation participants
from mediator bias.
C. Quality Process
Mediators also have an unwavering ethical obligation to con-
duct a quality process.47  The Model Standards define the media-
tor’s ethical duty to conduct a quality process, in pertinent part, as
one that “promotes . . . party participation, procedural fairness,
party competency and mutual respect among all participants.”48
This clause explicitly adopts a strategy to promote a quality process
by promoting “procedural fairness.”49  The theme of procedural
fairness is one that runs through this standard and there is no men-
tion of promoting a substantive fairness directly, as a few mediator
codes do.50  For example, the Georgia mediator ethical code pro-
vides that a mediator should refuse to sign a mediated agreement
42 Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways to Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
81, 90 (2003).
43 Susan Nauss Exon, How Can A Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Stan-
dards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 406 (2006).
44 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 834.
45 Id. at 833.
46 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005); Exon, supra note 40, at 387.
47 MODEL STANDARDS Standard VI(A) (2005).
48 Id. at Standard VI(A).
49 See id. at Standard VI(A).
50 See id. at Standard VI(A).
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that she feels is “fundamentally unfair to one party.”51  This places
the mediator in the position of judging the fairness of the result.
The drafters of the Model Code rejected this approach, as do most
jurisdictions.52  The drafters were particularly cognizant of the
temptation for mediators to assume other professional roles during
the mediation and tried to guide mediators in the appropriate use
of the knowledge and skill that they might possess from other ar-
eas, such as law or counseling.53  In this regard, the Model Stan-
dard states that “[t]he role of mediator differs substantially from
other professional roles . . . [and] [m]ixing the role of a mediator
and the role of another profession is problematic . . . .”54  Yet, the
Model Standards recognizes that the knowledge that mediators
possess from other spheres of their professional life can help par-
ties to resolve their differences.  The Model Standards state that
“the insights the mediator draws upon to assist parties in mediation
might simultaneously constitute an important element of enabling
a mediator to be competent and effective to serve the parties in
that setting and be drawn from the mediator’s training and experi-
ence in those other professional roles.”55  Consequently, the Model
Standards continue, a “mediator may provide information that the
mediator is qualified by training or experience to provide, only if
the mediator can do so consistent with these Standards.”56  The
drafters’ comments in particular stress that mediators must honor
the standards of party self-determination and mediator impartiality
when information is provided.57
D. Promoting Fairness in Mediation
A central goal of mediation is to produce fair agreements.58
The characteristics of a fair mediated agreement and how best to
51 GA ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR NEUTRALS IV.A, available at http://www.godr.org/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=57 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
52 Exon, supra note 31, at 586.
53 MODEL STANDARDS Standard VI(A)(5) (2005) (stating that a “mediator may provide in-
formation that the mediator is qualified by training or experience to provide, only if the media-
tor can do so consistent with these standards”).
54 Id. at Standard VI(A)(5).
55 Id. at Drafters’ Comments 18.
56 Id. at Standard VI (2005).
57 Id. at Drafters’ Comments 18 (2005).
58 Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator be Neutral? You Better Believe It!, 95 MARQ. L. REV.
829, 830 (2012); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through
Law, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 47, 49 (1996).
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consistently achieve fair agreements, however, are topics of consid-
erable debate among mediators and mediation scholars.59  One ba-
sic lesson that the Model Standards teach, and from which this
Article proceeds, is that a substantively “fair” mediated result has
only two criteria.  First, it is “fair” if the participants deem it ac-
ceptable.60  The idea that the appropriateness of a mediated agree-
ment is evaluated from the parties’ perspective has been called
“justice from below.”61  In mediation, “disputants shape the out-
come they find acceptable.”62  In shaping these mediated out-
comes, participants may embrace norms, “legal, moral, religious or
practical,” regardless of whether the norms used have been
“adopted by a legislature or articulated by the courts.”63  Dispu-
tants have the ability to seek “justice from above” if they wish by
having their dispute heard by a court or an arbitrator who will im-
pose a norm to decide the merits of a dispute.64  Indeed, of the
many benefits mediation offers disputants, the ability to craft and
control the outcome is among the most prized.65
As far as the mediator is concerned, if the process was fair, the
agreement should be deemed sufficiently and substantively fair
too.66  The kind of fairness that mediators should have utmost in
their minds and for which they have the greatest responsibility is
procedural fairness.67  “Good process,” it has been said, “almost
always yields a good outcome.”68  Thus, as outlined above, if the
party made a settlement decision uncoerced, assisted by an impar-
tial mediator who empowered the participant to participate as fully
as their resources allowed, then the agreement should be deemed
fair.  This criterion is not met if the agreement was obtained by
duress, fraud, incompetence or through one of the other legal im-
59 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 885; See Engler, supra note 1.
60 Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-Tension
Between the Aspirations of A Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Adversarial
Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 563 (2004).
61 Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CON-
FLICT RESOL. 213, 216 (2005); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator:
An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 160–61 (2002).
62 Stulberg, supra note 61, at 216.
63 Hyman et al., supra note 61, at 160; Stulberg, supra note 61, at 216.
64 Hyman et al., supra note 61, at 160–61; Stulberg, supra note 61, at 216.
65 Stulberg, supra note 61, at 238.
66 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do
With It, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 781, 818 (2001).
67 Susanne Terry & Christine Packard, Achieving Lasting Settlements for Vermont Families:
Justice, Equity, and Self-Determination, 36 VT. BUS. J. 18 (2010).
68 Panel Discussion, Core Values of Dispute Resolution: Is Neutrality Necessary?, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 805, 819 (2011).
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pediments to binding agreements.69  The fact that agreement is a
product of “unequal” bargaining power, however, is not enough for
the agreement to fail this test.70  Few negotiations match equally
powerful participants.71  To fail to meet a procedural fairness re-
quirement, an agreement must be so one-sided to be considered
unconscionable under the law of the relevant jurisdiction.72  This
construction of mediation fairness is akin to the legal philosopher
John Rawl’s concept of pure justice in which the “standard for de-
termining a fair or desired outcome is embedded in the process
itself.”73
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW OF INFORMED CONSENT
AND THE RISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
To determine the extent to which the law should impose the
doctrine of informed consent on mediators, it is important to revisit
the origins of the doctrine in American jurisprudence to uncover
the circumstances in which the doctrine arose and the policies it is
intended to promote.  The concept of informed consent has its ori-
gins in the physician-patient relationship.  The extent to which the
circumstances of physician-patient relationship and mediator-par-
ticipant relationship are analogous is a useful guide in deciding the
degree to which, if at all, informed consent should be incorporated
as one of a mediator’s standard duties.  As we will see, the evi-
dence on this score is mixed and leads to the conclusion that in-
formed consent should not be incorporated into mediation policy
on a wholesale basis.  Yet, the informed consent precedent does
support the extension of informed consent to mediators on a lim-
ited basis because mediators and physicians do play similar roles as
treatment experts in their respective disciplines.  To understand the
contours of how the physician-patient relationship is similar to the
69 Id.
70 Jennifer M. Ralph, Unconscionable Mediation Clauses: Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 10
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 383, 396 (2005).
71 Id. at 384.
72 17 C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 2; 3 CAL. AFFIRMATIVE DEF. § 55:1 (2013); CAL. CIV. CODE,
§ 1670.5 (2013).
73 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971) (David Miller, another legal philosopher,
like Rawls, sees justice as process and not an outcome.  Miller argues that a fair system of justice
has four characteristics: 1) it treats participants equally, 2) it considers relevant information, 3)
participants know the rules, and 4) it treats participants with respect.).
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mediator-participant relationship and how it is not, let us now ex-
amine the evolution of the informed consent doctrine.
A. Overview of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and
Medicine’s Beneficence Model
It likely will come as a surprise to those unfamiliar with the
history of informed consent that it is a modern legal convention
and not, as one might suppose, an ancient birthright enshrined in
an old yellowing document attesting to human enlightenment, like
the Magna Carta.  The legal theory of informed consent as we
know it today is just over fifty years old and its origins can be
found only slightly further back in time in the early 1900’s, a little
more than one hundred years ago, making it a relative newcomer
to the legal lexicon.74  The legal theory of informed consent springs
out of the medical treatment context, but has branched out into
human experiments and research, as well as other professions, such
as law and financial management.75  Informed consent in the medi-
cal context, and in its most basic form, is an affirmation by the
patient that she “truly understands the parameters of the proposed
treatment and agrees to accept treatment.”76  Informed consent
changed the practice of medicine in the United States arguably
more than any other modern legal doctrine.77  Physicians interact
with their patients in profoundly different ways and now provide
far greater medical information than in any other time in history.
Up until roughly fifty years ago, American physicians prac-
ticed medicine and dispersed information to their patients under
74 See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (the first Supreme Court
case to discuss the general concept of informed consent); see also Salgo v. Leland Standford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (first court to reference
“informed consent”); see also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (one of the
first cases to require disclosure).
75 John H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Con-
tainment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 275 (1999).
76 Grimm, supra note 3, at 41.
77 Id. at 39 (The informed consent “doctrine and its exceptions continue to have a broad
impact on the practice of medicine and the evolution of society.”). Informed consent is continu-
ously evolving in many areas of medicine. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (analyzing informed consent requirements in state abortion laws, specifically
the ability of a minor to consent); see also Suzanne K. Keller, The Rebirth of Informed Consent:
A Cultural Analysis of the Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Insurance
Co. of Wisconsin, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2001) (discussing informed consent with regard
to childbirth, stating that there is a “current trend towards greater patient autonomy and control
during labor and childbirth.”).
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the guiding principles of the “beneficence” model.78  The physi-
cian’s paramount duty under this model was to “maximize the pa-
tient’s medical benefits.”79  The beneficence model of medicine has
its origins, not surprisingly, in the Hippocratic Oaths, which not
only tolerate physicians not communicating medical details to pa-
tients, but in fact advocates proactive deception if the physician
deems it for medical benefit.  One of the Hippocratic Oaths advises
physicians to “conceal[ ] most things from the patient, while you
are attending to him . . . turning his attention away from what is
being done to him; . . . revealing nothing of the patient’s future or
present condition.”80  The beneficence model also supported out-
right lying to patients as long as it was calculated for his or her
medical benefit.81  Only during the last century did the medical
profession begin to debate the strict tenants of the beneficence
model.82  Even then, it was case law, not the medical community,
that imposed upon physicians the duty of informed consent.83
Validly obtained informed consent is comprised of three con-
ditions.  First, the patient must have the mental capacity to give
consent.84  A patient has sufficient mental capacity to provide in-
formed consent if she can “appreciate the reasonable foreseeable
consequences of her decision.”85  Second, the physician must make
adequate disclosures to the patient.86  These disclosures must be
relevant and understandable to the patient.87  Third, the patient’s
treatment decisions must be voluntary.88  A voluntary decision
means deciding “without force, coercion, or manipulation.”89  This
Article is primarily concerned with the second condition, the ade-
quacy of information that a physician discloses to his patient.  The
story of how and why the courts imposed the doctrine of informed
consent on the medical field is worth exploring because it is rele-
78 RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CON-
SENT 59, 128 (1986).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 61.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id. at 86.
83 Id. at 93.
84 Edward Etchells, Informed Consent in Surgical Trials, 23 WORLD J. SURGERY 1215, 1215
(1999).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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vant to the question of whether it should be imposed on the media-
tion field.
B. The Origins of Informed Consent In American Jurisprudence
Informed consent’s evolution as a legal theory is a story con-
sisting of three acts.  In act one, at the turn of the last century be-
tween the years 1905-14, four cases from different states planted
the seeds from which the modern doctrine of informed consent
sprung.90  These cases identified self-determination as the underly-
ing policy animating the doctrine of informed consent, and intro-
duced the idea, without fully forming it, that a certain degree of
knowledge about the risks and benefits of a particular course of
medical treatment was part of proper consent.91  Act two began
more than forty years later in 1957 with the courts embracing the
policy of self-determination and coining the term “informed con-
sent.”92  The courts further created the first professional practice
legal standard for deciding whether the information physicians
shared in advance of treatment was of the appropriate type and
degree to which a patient was entitled before consent could be
deemed “informed.”93  Act three, still unfolding, commenced in
1972 with the abandonment of the professional practice standard of
care in some jurisdictions, which looked to physicians’ common
practice as the standard for the required level of information dis-
closed to the patient, in favor of a new standard.94  This new stan-
dard looks at what a reasonably prudent patient would want to
know before treatment, creating the “patient-centered standard”
of care for deciding informed consent issues.95  Although it remains
a minority view, the patient-centered standard of care for deciding
informed consent issues in medical care is slowly gaining ground.96
90 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W.
12, 15 (1905); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913); Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1905).
91 See Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93 (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”).
92 See Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (first court to reference “informed consent”).
93 Id.
94 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95 Id. (developed the “patient-centered” standard for informed consent instead of the previ-
ously used “physician-centered” standard).
96 Anna Karpman, Informed Consent: Does the First Amendment Protect a Patient’s Right to
Choose Alternative Treatment?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 933, 937–38 (2000) (“The majority
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1. Act One: The Formation of Modern Consent
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, who had the skill of reducing com-
plex and often novel, legal theory to accessible and memorable lan-
guage, aptly captured the meaning of consent in the opinion that
he wrote for Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals; one of
the four cases to establish the foundation of modern informed con-
sent theory.97  Justice Cardozo, in his now famous dicta, pro-
claimed that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”98  In this
section, we will explore the meaning of these words through a
more detailed review of just one of the four early consent cases,
Mohr v. Williams, which, more than the others, provides a ratio-
nale for the necessity of a robust theory of consent to medical
treatment.99
Modern theory of informed consent was born in Minnesota in
1905 in the case of Mohr v. Williams.100  The Mohr case, unlike its
predecessors, firmly anchored consent to medical treatment in the
patient’s right to self-determination and autonomy.101  It accom-
plished this, in part, by recognizing that consent was not merely a
technical act of affirmation, but one in which the patient assents to
treatment with sufficient knowledge to act rationally, giving rise to
true autonomy.102  In Mohr, the patient, Anna Mohr, successfully
sued her physician, Cornelius Williams, in a cause of action for bat-
tery.  Cornelius Williams performed surgery on her left ear without
her consent when she had only given permission to operate on her
right ear.103  Mohr went to her physician because of a hearing prob-
lem in her right ear.104  She recounted no problems with her left
ear.105  Upon an initial examination, her physician discovered per-
foration of the eardrum and a polyp in her right ear and recom-
of jurisdictions adhere to the professional standard, making the patient’s ‘right to know’ depend
upon the medical custom in a particular community.”).
97 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
98 Id. at 93.
99 Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (1905).
100 Id.
101 Id. (“A surgical operation by a physician upon the body of his patient is wrongful and
unlawful when performed without the express or implied consent of the patient.”).
102 Id. at 12.
103 Id. at 13.
104 Id.
105 Mohr, 104 N.W. at 13.
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mended surgery.106  After consulting with her personal physician,
Mohr agreed to the procedure.107  Shortly after being sedated in
preparation for the operation on her right ear, and while she was
unconscious, a more thorough examination uncovered disease in
the left ear that her physician deemed even more serious than that
in the right ear.108  The physician operated on Mohr’s left ear in-
stead without obtaining her consent, removing the diseased por-
tions of her eardrum and inner wall of the ear, which she later
claimed impaired her hearing greatly.109  Although the operation
was “in every way successful and skillfully performed,” the trial
court awarded the plaintiff $14,322.50 in damages, a considerable
sum in 1905, because it determined the operation to be unlawful
because Mohr did not give the physician her consent to surgery on
her left ear.110
The physician appealed the verdict on the grounds that the
patient’s consent to operate on the left ear was unnecessary be-
cause her express consent to operate on the right ear implied con-
sent to operate on the left ear as well.111  The court roundly
rejected the physician’s argument and found that for him to law-
fully operate on Mohr’s left ear he must have her express con-
sent.112  In supporting its ruling, the Mohr appellate court first
relied on established battery precedent by stating, “‘the free citi-
zen’s first and greatest right, which underlies all others—the right
to the inviolability of his person . . . and the right necessarily for-
bids a physician or surgeon . . . to violate, without permission, the
bodily integrity of his patient by a major capital operation.’”113
The court, however, went beyond established precedent, and be-
yond simple “inviolability of person” to establish the idea that con-
sent must also involve some level of rationale choice.114  The court
explained that when “the physician advises his patient to submit to
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. (The defendant brought his discovery to the attention of the plaintiff’s personal physi-
cian, “who attended the operation at [plaintiff’s] request—who also examined the [left] ear, and
confirmed defendant in his diagnosis.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 13.
111 Mohr, 104 N.W at 14.
112 Id. at 15 (“If the physician advises his patient to submit to a particular operation, and the
patient weighs the dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents, he
thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to operate to the extent of the
consent given, but no further.”).
113 Id. at 14 (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1905)).
114 Id. at 15.
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a particular operation, and the patient weighs the dangers and risks
incident to its performance, and finally consents, he thereby, in ef-
fect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to operate to
the extent of the consent given, but no further.”115
The court further clarified the relationship between physician
and patient and the roles that each plays in a patient’s care by ac-
knowledging that a physician agrees that he will “exercise reasona-
ble care and exert his best judgment to bring about favorable
results . . . and [although] the methods of treatment are committed
almost exclusively to his judgment . . .[there is] no rule or principle
of law which would extend to him free license respecting surgical
operations.”116  To clearly define the new role that self determina-
tion would play in the law of consent, and establishing consent as a
legal right, the court emphasized that “‘[t]he patient must be the
final arbiter as to whether he will take his chances with the opera-
tion, or take his chances of living without it.’”117  This established
informed consent as a more deliberative process and not merely
assent.  In act two of the informed consent story, to which we will
now turn, the court clarified the role of the physician in helping
patients make better-informed treatment decisions.
2. Act Two: Consent Becomes “Informed”
The second half of the Twentieth Century brought with it, be-
ginning with the 1957 decision in Salgo v. Stanford University, a
consensus in the courts that a physician must reasonably “inform”
his patient of the potential benefits and risks of a proposed course
of medical treatment for consent to be valid.118  In assessing the
validity of consent a brace of court decisions in the same dispute,
Natanson v. Kline, established that an action for failing to inform
was more properly styled in negligence than in battery, as had been
the trend in previous decisions.119  In establishing negligence as the
proper cause of action in disputes alleging that physicians failed to
115 Id. (The court acknowledged that emergency situations negated the requirement of ex-
press consent, but found no such circumstances here. It also explained that if “in the course of an
operation to which the patient has consented,” the physician discovered unanticipated disease,
which if not treated, could endanger the patient’s health, the physician may expand the scope of
the operation without the patient’s express consent.  Again, however, the court found that oper-
ating on the left ear, when given the patient’s consent to operate on the right ear did not fall
within this circumstance.)
116 Id. at 12, 15.
117 Mohr, 104 N.W. at 14–15 (quoting KINKEAD, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 375 [1903 ed.]).
118 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181.
119 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
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properly inform their patients before embarking on a course of
medical treatment, Natanson articulated the professional practice
standard for informed consent that prevails today in most
jurisdictions.120
In Salgo, the California appellate court coined the term “in-
formed consent” and, in a precedent setting decision, explicitly re-
quired physicians to share sufficient information with their patients
so that they could make intelligent choices about their medical
care.121  The plaintiff, Martin Salgo, sued his physicians and the
treating hospital for negligence in administering an aortography
procedure that left his lower extremities permanently paralyzed.122
Part of the plaintiff’s negligence claim asserted that his primary
physician should have warned him about the dangers of the
aortography procedure.123  The plaintiff had been suffering circula-
tory problems in his legs that made walking both difficult and pain-
ful.124  Plaintiff’s physician prescribed the aortography procedure
to confirm and locate blood circulation blockages suspected of
causing the patient’s health problems.125  The patient was under an-
esthesia during the procedure, which involved inserting a large
needle into the aorta, which lies in front of the spinal column.126
Although paralysis is a known risk of this procedure, the plaintiff’s
primary physician admitted that “the details of the procedure and
the possible dangers therefrom were not explained [to the
patient].”127
In remanding the case to the lower court for failing to properly
instruct the jury on the issue of consent, the Salgo court explained
that “[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects him-
self to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the pro-
posed treatment.”128  The court further warned that a physician
120 Id. (“The duty of the physician to disclose . . . is limited to those disclosures which a
reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.”).
121 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (“A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to
liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent
by the patient to the proposed treatment.”).
122 Id. at 173–75.
123 Id. at 181.
124 Id. at 172–73 (Plaintiff’s “chief complaint was cramping pains in his legs, mostly in the
calves, causing intermittent limping.  This condition had started gradually, becoming increasingly
more severe.”).
125 Id.
126 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 174.
127 Id. at 181.
128 Id.
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“may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation
in order to induce his patient’s consent.”129
In an effort to balance a patient’s right to know the risks and
benefits of a contemplated medical treatment against a physician’s
duty to not undermine the overall health of the patient by causing
undue alarm and stress by communicating risks of treatment that
might be possible, but remote, the court took action.  The Salgo
Court granted physicians a degree of discretion in deciding how
much information was appropriate to share with the patient.130  It
is helpful to quote the Salgo court at length on this issue, as it sets
the stage for the development of the first legal standard in defining
the extent of a physician’s duty of informed consent.131  The court
explained:
At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his
patient above all else and this very fact places him in a position
in which he sometimes must choose between two alternative
courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk at-
tendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter
how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is
already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to
undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may
also result in actually increasing the risks by reason of the physi-
ological results of the apprehension itself. The other is to recog-
nize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in
certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element
of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consis-
tent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent.132
Here, the court articulates the tension between patient autonomy
and the physician’s responsibility for overall quality of care that
persists today, a tension that will inform the first true legal stan-
dard in informed consent theory articulated in the Natanson
dispute.133
129 Id.
130 Id. (“[T]he physician has such discretion consistent . . . with the full disclosure of facts
necessary to an informed consent.”).
131 Id.
132 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
133 See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (“The duty of the physician to
disclose . . . is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make
under the same or similar circumstances.”).  The issue regarding the circumstances under which
a physician should withhold medical information from a patient—or even lie to a patient—for
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Helping to reconcile this tension, two decisions issued by the
Kansas Supreme Court in the Natanson v. Kline case provided the
first negligence legal standard for informed consent.134  Before
Natanson, claims for failure to obtain informed consent were most
often styled as battery claims.135  After Natanson, the informed
consent disclosure requirements, whether styled as battery or negli-
gence claims, were “virtually identical.”136  The plaintiff, Irma
Natanson, sued her attending physician for, among other things,
failing to warn her of the inherit dangers of undergoing cobalt radi-
ation therapy.137  The plaintiff underwent cobalt radiation therapy
after a mastectomy of her left breast because of cancer and suf-
fered severe radiation burns as a result of the treatment.138  The
weight of evidence suggested that the plaintiff’s physician failed to
inform her of the risks of the cobalt radiation, which was a rela-
tively new treatment at the time.139  In reversing the lower court’s
judgment in favor of the defendants and granting a new trial be-
cause of inadequate jury instructions on the nature of the negli-
gence, the court explained the proper legal standard for informed
consent.140  Citing Salgo, the Natanson court first reaffirmed the
physician’s obligation to assure that the patient “has given an intel-
ligent consent to a proposed form of treatment.”141  The Natanson
court further clarified the proper rule for assessing the adequacy of
informed consent.142  The court explained that the physician’s duty
to disclose “is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable med-
ical practitioner would make under the same or similar circum-
stances.”143  Emphasizing that the appropriateness of the
information explained to the patient is a medical judgment, the
court further explained that:
[s]o long as the disclosure is sufficient to assure an informed
consent, the physician’s choice of plausible courses should not
be called into question if it appears, all circumstances consid-
the patient’s benefit is one with which physicians still struggle.  Sandeep Jauhar, When Doctors
Need to Lie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 22, 2014.
134 Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
135 FADEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 130.
136 Id. at 131.
137 Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1100–01 (plaintiff “consented to the treatment, but alleges . . . that
the nature and consequences of the risks of the treatment were not properly explained to her”).
138 Id. at 1095.
139 Id. at 1906–07.
140 Id. at 1106, 1009.
141 Id. at 1106.
142 Id.
143 Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
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ered, that the physician was motivated only by the patient’s best
therapeutic interests and he proceeded as competent medical
men would have done in a similar situation.144
The professional practice standard for informed consent continued
unchallenged for more than twenty-five years until the case of Can-
terbury vs. Spence, which began act three of the story of informed
consent to which we will now turn.
3. Act Three: The Patient-Centered Standard of Care
In act three of the history of informed consent, the court fur-
ther refined the doctrine by shifting the standard of care inquiry to
what a reasonable patient would want to know and away from what
a reasonable physician should explain, creating a significant minor-
ity view that prevails in an increasing number of jurisdictions.145
The new patient-centered standard of care is best explained in
Canterbury v. Spence, one of three 1972 court decisions to establish
this new trend.146  In Canterbury, the patient, Jerry Canterbury,
sued his physician, William Spence, for, among other things, failure
to warn of the risks of paralysis associated with a laminectomy,
which involves the surgical removal of bone on the spinal verte-
brae.147  In reversing a directed judgment in favor of the physician
and hospital, the Canterbury court remanded the case to the lower
court with instructions to submit the issue to the jury regarding the
physician’s negligent failure to reasonably inform the patient of the
procedure’s known risks.  In doing so, it created the patient-cen-
tered reasonable person standard, a new legal standard for acces-
sing the adequacy of patient consent.148
Mr. Canterbury sought the care of his physician for back
pain.149  After an examination and several diagnostic tests, the de-
fendant-physician determined that a ruptured disk for which a
laminectomy was recommended likely caused the back pain.150  Ev-
144 Id.
145 FADEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 133 (Two other important court decisions, all decided in
1972, helped to make the shift from a physician–centered standard of care to a patient centered-
standard of care.  They are Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229 (1972) and Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295
A.2d 676 (R. I. 1972)).
146 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147 Id. at 778 (“Against Dr. Spence [plaintiff] alleged, among other things, negligence in per-
formance of the laminectomy and failure to inform him beforehand of the risk involved.”).
148 Id. at 794 (The court held that the “jury, not Dr. Spence, was the final arbiter of whether
nondisclosure was reasonable under the circumstances.”).
149 Id. at 776.
150 Id. at 776–77.
2014] INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION 727
idence showed that the physician failed to warn the patient that the
procedure carried with it a one percent chance of paralysis.151  The
only indication that the physician gave of the operation’s risks was
in response to the patient’s mother’s question whether the opera-
tion was serious.  To this question, the physician replied, “not more
than any other operation.”152  The physician performed the opera-
tion, during which he treated the ruptured disk.153  During the first
day, the patient seemed to be recovering normally.154  However,
the patient fell while trying to make his way to the bathroom and
within hours he became paralyzed from the waist down.155
Like prior court decisions, the Canterbury court emphasized
that self-determination was a bedrock principle upon which the
doctrine of informed consent rested.156  “True consent,” the court
explained, can only occur with “informed exercise of a choice and
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowingly the options avail-
able and the risks attendant upon each.”157  Because the “average
patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts,” the
court further explained, it is the duty of physicians “to warn of the
dangers lurking in the proposed treatment.”158  Although the Can-
terbury court invoked precedent to reaffirm the “fiducial qualities”
of the physician-patient relationship, it abandoned the professional
practice standard of disclosure and adopted the patient-centered
standard for determining the adequacy of disclosures of the risks
and benefits of a proposed course of treatment.159  The new pa-
tient-centered standard measures the appropriateness of disclosure
by what a “reasonably prudent” patient “has every right to ex-
pect.”160  The professional practice standard, on the other hand,
measures appropriateness of disclosure from the perspective of
what a reasonable physician would disclose.161 In rejecting the pro-
151 Id. at 778 (“Dr. Spence . . . testified that even without trauma paralysis can be anticipated
‘somewhere in the nature of one percent’ of the laminectomies performed, a risk he termed ‘a
very slight possibility.’”).
152 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 777.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. (There was “some conflict as to precisely when or why [plaintiff] fell.” Plaintiff “testi-
fied that during the [process of voiding] he slipped off the side of his bed, and that there was no
one to assist him, or side rail to prevent the fall.”).
156 Id. at 780.
157 Id.
158 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780, 782.
159 Id. at 782.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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fessional practice standard, the court found it troubling that under
this standard a discloser violation could be found only if “it was the
custom of physicians practicing in the community to make a partic-
ular disclosure to a patient.”162  To rely exclusively on physicians’
disclosure practices, the court explained, “is to arrogate the deci-
sion on revelation to the physician alone.”163  It further reasoned
that “[r]espect for the patient’s right of self-determination on par-
ticular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather
than one which physicians may or may not impose on them-
selves.”164  Summarizing the difference between the physician-cen-
tered standard and the patient–centered standard, a New Jersey
court said, “the sufficiency of disclosure under the prudent patient
standard requires that the disclosure be viewed through the mind
of the patient, not the physician.”165  Implicit in this shift of empha-
sis is the recognition that expert testimony is no longer required in
order to establish the medical community’s standard for disclosure
and whether a physician failed to meet that standard.166
The patient-centered standard of care is still a minority view,
but a growing trend in American informed consent jurispru-
dence.167  An important practical consequence of adopting a pa-
tient-centered standard of disclosure is that lay testimony will
often, although not always, be sufficient to establish a valid claim
for breach of informed consent.168  Under the professional practice
rule, by definition, expert testimony was almost always required to
establish a violation of reasonable physician care.169
The Canterbury court also clarified the role of proximate
cause and how to establish it in informed consent disputes.170
Proximate cause is a necessary element in all negligence actions.171
In this context proximate cause requires that a “causal relation-
ship” between the physician’s failure to inform and harm to the
162 Id at 783.
163 Id. at 784.
164 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784.
165 Febus v. Barot, 616 A.2d 933, 936 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
166 See id.
167 Karpman, supra note 96, at 937–38.
168 Febus, 616 A.2d at 935–36 (holding that while “no medical expert is required to prove that
an undisclosed risk would have been material to the patient’s consent, it must first be shown that
the risk was one of which the physician should have been aware, and that it was recognized
within the medical community.”).
169 See id. at 935 (discussing the burden of proving a violation under the professional practice
rule).
170 Canterbury, 464 F. 2d at 790–91.
171 Id. at 790 (“[N]egligence unrelated to [an] injury is nonactionable.”).
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patient.172  The court explained “[a]n unrevealed risk that should
have been made known must materialize, for otherwise the omis-
sion, however, unpardonable, is legally without consequence.”173
In an additional flight from precedent, the court adopted an objec-
tive proximate cause standard.174  Under this standard, the proper
inquiry in deciding the “causality issue . . . is what a prudent person
in the patient’s position would have decided if suitably informed of
all the perils bearing significance.”175  The inquiry is not what this
patient says he would have done.176  The court preferred an objec-
tive proximate cause standard more than a subjective standard for
several reasons.  The court reasoned that assessing what a person
might have done “if” certain information where known is always,
at best, “purely hypothetical.”  The inquiry “would the patient
have decided differently had he known something he did not know
. . . hardly represents more than a guess, perhaps tinged by the
circumstance that the uncommunicated hazard has in fact material-
ized.”177  Finally, the court felt that leaving such an important in-
quiry to only the patient’s credibility was problematic.178
4. The Modern Informed Consent Doctrine
The modern doctrine of informed consent continues to evolve
largely in the common law although many states have passed in-
formed consent statutory law.179  These statutes have generally
been attempts to codify common law rather than substantially
change the doctrine.180  Below is the modern understanding of
what it means to obtain informed consent in medical practice:
(1) A description of the recommended treatment or procedure;
(2) [a] description of the risks and benefits of the recommended
procedure, with special emphasis on risks of death or serious
bodily disability; (3) [a] description of the alternatives, including
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 790–91 (The court recognized that the usual “method of dealing with the issue on
causation comes in second-best.  It places a physician in jeopardy of the patient’s hindsight and
bitterness.”).
175 Id. at 791.
176 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 772.
177 Id. at 790.
178 Id. at 790–91 (“It places the factfinder in the position of deciding whether a speculative
answer to a hypothetical question is to be credited.”).
179 Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the Uma, 2003
J. DISP. RESOL. 99, 120 (2003) (rather than trying to establish new laws, the laws attempt to
create uniformity).
180 Id.; Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 836.
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other treatments or procedures, together with the risks and ben-
efits of these alternatives; (4) [t]he likely results of no treatment;
(5) [t]he probability of success, and what the physician means by
success; (6) [t]he major problems anticipated in recuperation,
and the time period during which the patient will not be able to
resume his or her normal activities; and (7) [a]ny other informa-
tion generally provided to patients in this situation by other
qualified physicians.181
If modern informed consent in the medical field embraces one
overarching principle, that principle is patient understanding.  Pa-
tient understanding comes with the recognition that informed con-
sent is not a single “event,” but rather a “process involving a series
of questions and answers.”182  The physician must ensure that the
patient has understood the information the physician communi-
cates, which often means simplifying complex medical and statisti-
cal information so it is intellectually digestible to a lay person.183
The doctrine of informed consent has been imported to other
spheres of human relations and decision-making, beyond medical
treatment.  These include medical research involving human exper-
imentation, financial and legal practice.184  Legal practice, for ex-
ample, is replete with circumstances where a lawyer must obtain
informed consent from his client to proceed with a course of ac-
tion.  In this context, informed consent “denotes the agreement by
a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has com-
municated adequate information and explanation about the mate-
rial risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct.”185  The questions to which we now turn are
whether and to what extent informed consent should govern medi-
ator practice.
IV. A MEDIATOR SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN
INFORMED OUTCOME CONSENT, BUT SHOULD BE
REQUIRED TO OBTAIN INFORMED
PARTICIPATION CONSENT
Requiring mediators to obtain informed outcome consent is
unethical and imprudent because it violates a mediator’s duty of
181 GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 8 (3d ed. 2004).
182 Grimm, supra note 3, at 43.
183 Id.
184 FADEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 30, 51.
185 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.0 (e) (2013).
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impartiality.  Mediators cannot unduly assist one party to the detri-
ment of another, no matter how well intended that assistance may
be.  Mediators must promote participants’ informed settlement
choices, whether represented by counsel or not, within established
ethical boundaries.  Information gathering and assessment tech-
niques in the hands of a skilled mediator, as will be discussed more
fully below, promotes informed outcome consent by maximizing
the information available to an unrepresented party.  In short, me-
diation promotes fairness, even without requiring informed out-
come consent.  Requiring mediators to obtain informed outcome
consent would impose on the mediator, in some circumstances, the
duty to give legal advice and counsel to pro se parties.  This may
require that a mediator inform the pro se party about the existence
of claims and defenses of which they were unaware and explain to
them the likelihood of success on those claims and defenses if the
dispute were adjudicated.  This theory would require the mediator
to be an advocate for the pro se party, which is presently unethical
and inconsistent with the mediator’s role.
Mediators should be required, however, to obtain informed
participation consent because it is ethical, it is consistent with the
mediator’s role, and it enhances informed outcome consent.  Par-
ties should enter the mediation with a full appreciation of the na-
ture of that process and an understanding of the benefits and risks
of the model of mediation that the mediator practices.  This is so
even in circumstances where litigants have been court-ordered to
participate in mediation.  When fully informed of the risks and
benefits of the mediation process, participants can make better set-
tlement choices or decide not to settle at all.  Prohibiting the re-
quirement of informed outcome consent but requiring informed
participation consent strikes the appropriate balance of a media-
tor’s sometimes conflicting duties by maximizing party self-deter-
mination while honoring the mediator’s other fundamental ethical
duties of promoting a quality process and remaining impartial.
A. Mediators Cannot Ethically Be Required to Provide
Informed Outcome Consent Because it Violates Their
Duty of Impartiality
To understand the full extent of the ethical and practical diffi-
culties in applying informed outcome consent to mediation, it is
necessary first to understand how proponents of it envision in-
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formed outcome consent working in practice.  Although several
scholars have advocated for mediators taking more directive ap-
proaches to assisting parties in making informed settlement
choices, Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley provides the most artic-
ulate and well-developed analysis of the argument.186  In her semi-
nal article on the topic, Professor Nolan-Haley, a thoughtful
mediation scholar, argues for a “robust” doctrine of informed con-
sent in mediation.187  Her article correctly highlights the impor-
tance of helping unrepresented mediation participants to make
informed decisions about the acceptability of settlement terms be-
cause uninformed choice can lead to “harmful results.”188  The
need for addressing this potential is becoming ever more acute, she
correctly explains, as parties and courts increasingly rely upon
ADR, especially mediation, to address disputes.189  She argues that
mediators should be charged with the duty of obtaining informed
consent from unrepresented parties because only with “fully in-
formed consent” can parties exercise self-determination.190  Her
model of informed consent envisions a “sliding scale” where medi-
ator responsibility varies depending on three variables: whether the
mediation was ordered or voluntary, whether the mediation occurs
in a court or another location—such as a private law office—and
whether the party is represented by counsel.191  The workability of
a sliding scale, the degree to which voluntariness can be reasonably
discerned and whether the location of the mediation is relevant to
the doctrine of informed consent are not topics that this Article
intends to address.  The main interest of this Article is addressing
the propriety of Professor Nolan-Haley’s conclusion, as well as the
conclusion of other scholars, that under the most protective point
of her sliding scale, where the participant has no counsel and is
ordered to mediate by the court, mediators should have a duty to
obtain informed outcome consent.  Imposing such a duty, she
avers, will “insure that the parties have a minimum level of under-
standing of the outcomes to which they agree.”192  As we will ex-
plore more fully below, Professor Nolan-Haley’s vision of insuring
that pro se litigants “minimally understand” their settlement
choice, goes beyond explaining their rights and responsibilities
186 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 836–37.
187 Id. at 812.
188 Id. at 776.
189 Id. at 777.
190 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 840.
191 Id. at 827.
192 Id. at 827.
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under the terms of the settlement.  In her view, mediators must
also advise the pro se party of the rights they are waiving, even
unasserted rights, by settlement and assess for them how likely it
would have been for them to vindicate these rights in court.
In her article on informed consent in mediation, Professor No-
lan-Haley refers to her solution for providing greater self-determi-
nation for pro se participants as the “informative decision-making
model” and recommends that mediators act as a “conduit of legal
information.”193  She explains that mediators must provide suffi-
cient information about legal claims so that unrepresented partici-
pants can make “informed choices,” as that concept is typically
understood under traditional informed consent law.  Here, an ex-
tended quote from Professor Nolan-Haley’s article will be helpful:
I do not advocate that court mediation sessions replicate the ad-
versarial model or that mediation outcomes approximate what is
available in court.  I do argue, however, that when courts re-
quire unrepresented parties to mediate, that their mediation
outcomes be informed by law. This is not to suggest that, once
informed of their legal entitlements, parties will automatically
seek legal remedies in the mediation process.  Other nonlegal
values may matter more.  But if the principle of informed con-
sent means anything in court mediation, it means that parties
should be able to decide for themselves what values do matter.
They should know what legal entitlements they are waiving in
the name of autonomy and self-determination.  By understand-
ing their legal and nonlegal interest, they can make tradeoffs
among these interests that are at least reasonably educated.194
In this quote, Professor Nolan-Haley distinguishes herself from
scholars that evaluate the fairness of a mediated agreement by the
degree to which the mediated outcome approximates an outcome
the party might have obtained had a court adjudicated his or her
claim.195  Here, she explains, it is acceptable for mediation partici-
pants to trade the chance at fully vindicating legal rights for other
practical benefits.196  For example, a litigant in a divorce proceed-
ing might forgo the chance of a more favorable financial trial
award for a more modest settlement with the goal of having better
relations with a soon to be ex-spouse.  This choice in Professor No-
lan-Haley’s view is acceptable as long as the spouse knows what he
193 Id. at 836.
194 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 836–37.
195 Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 505 (1991).
196 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 836.
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or she is giving up by not pursuing his or her rights in court.  To be
able to make these tradeoffs and decide what values matter more,
however, Professor Nolan-Haley argues that mediators must pro-
vide enough “information” so that participants can make reasona-
ble assessments of competing values.197  But she does not explain
what she means by “information.”
For a mediation participant to make these kinds of assess-
ments in any meaningful way, Professor Nolan-Haley must use the
term “information” as is understood in the medical informed con-
sent context.  She must be arguing for the mediator to adopt a role
similar to that of a physician.  In the informed consent medical con-
text, “information” means all information that the participant
needs to make a fully informed decision about the choice of settle-
ment.198  Under this “informative decision-making model,” as she
labels it, “the mediator acts as a conduit of legal information to
promote the parties’ understanding.”199  This legal information, she
further explains, “may include a general overview of the range of
legal entitlements that might be available.”  As a concrete example
of this duty in action, Professor Nolan-Haley explains that “[i]f a
statute of limitations or treble damages award were relevant to a
claimant’s case,” the mediator has a duty to make the participant
“aware of their existence and their possible impact on recovery.”200
To explain properly to a pro se litigant the “possible impact on
recovery,” although Professor Nolan-Haley never states so explic-
itly, it would not be enough in many circumstances that mediators
merely explain that he or she may have a particular claim or de-
fense if the goal is to obtain informed consent.  The mediator
would need to provide the likelihood of success of that claim or
defense, and its probable effect on the outcome of the adjudication
for the participant to be fully informed.  As was stated in the Mohr
decision more than a hundred years ago, “‘[t]he patient must be
the final arbiter as to whether he will take his chances with the
operation, or take his chances of living without it.’”201  So, too, a
mediation participant, if we require informed outcome consent,
must be the “final arbiter” of whether he will take his chances with
the settlement or at adjudication.202  To make a fully informed de-
197 Id.
198 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14–15 (1905) (quoting KINKNEAD, 1 COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF TORTS, AT § 375 (1903 ed.)).
202 See id.
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cision, the pro se litigant must understand the chances of success.203
Under Professor Nolan-Haley’s informative decision-making
model, where a pro se litigant has been compelled to mediation, it
is the mediator’s duty to explain those chances of success to the
party.204
Of course, this makes perfect sense under Professor Nolan-
Haley’s theory of mediation that requires “intelligent choice.”205
As we have seen, informed consent, even in its earliest stages of
development, required physicians to explain the risks of a proce-
dure.  Again, as early as 1905, in the Mohr decision, the court rec-
ognized that informed consent was at its heart a weighing of
risks.206  In Mohr, the court stated “the physician advises his pa-
tient to submit to a particular operation, and the patient weighs the
dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents,
he thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physi-
cian to operate to the extent of the consent given, but no fur-
ther.”207  Similarly, in 1957, the Salgo court, finding a physician
failed to warn his patient of the risks of a diagnostic procedure,
explained “[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to
form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the pro-
posed treatment.”208  The modern formulation of informed consent
explicitly requires that the physician explain “the probability of
success, and what the physician means by success.”209
Mediators will not be able to obtain informed consent by the
simply listing possible claims or defenses the participant might be
waiving by settlement.  To simply provide a list of every possible
claim or affirmative defense that a party might possess in litigation
without any information about the relative merits of those claims
and an estimate of the likelihood of success would be irresponsible
in the extreme.  It would do more harm than good in many circum-
stances.  This would be analogous to a physician explaining that a
particular course of cancer treatment carries with it a risk of death
or paralysis without any information as to how great those risks
are.  How in such a circumstance can a patient make an informed
choice without knowing the extent of the risk?  Indeed, it would be
203 See id.
204 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 835–36.
205 See id.
206 Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15.
207 Id.
208 Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
209 ANNAS, supra note 181.
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negligent, as we have seen in the physician-patient context, if the
physician did not explain the full extent of the risks to the pa-
tient.210  Similarly, for unrepresented parties in mediation to make
“robustly” informed decisions about the “tradeoffs” of settlement,
they must be provided some understanding of what the likelihood
of succeeding on the claims if the matter proceeded to trial.211  This
is the view of “information” that is demanded by modern informed
consent theory.212
Mediators would be providing legal advice if a state adopts an
informative mediation model.213  This knowing evaluation must in-
clude information about “the risks and benefits of these alterna-
tives.”214  Certainly, such an interpretation of Professor Nolan-
Haley’s is consistent with her version of a “robust” informed con-
sent in which unrepresented participants “have a minimum level of
understanding of the outcomes to which they agree.”215  Such a
version of informed consent, however, is tantamount to proving le-
gal counsel and advice in violation of the Model Standards.
Providing legal counsel and advice to any party, even a pro se
party, is unethical under the Model Standards and most state medi-
ator ethical codes.  The Model Standards define impartiality as a
mediator’s being free from “favoritism, bias or prejudice.”216  The
Model Standards require a mediator to treat the participants im-
partially regardless of his or her “personal characteristics . . . or
performance at the mediation.”217  If mediators are required to ob-
tain informed outcome consent from unrepresented mediation par-
ticipants by explaining “the range of possible outcomes and the
laws that may affect those outcomes,” it is inevitable that they will
be aiding one party to the detriment of another.  This amounts to
the mediator taking on the legal representation of one of the par-
ticipants and is a violation of their ethical duties of impartiality.218
Mediators and mediation scholars nearly universally agree: “medi-
210 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960).
211 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
212 ANNAS, supra note 181.
213 See Canterbury, 464 F. 2d at 780 (Informed consent in the medical context, as the court
explained in the Canterbury decision, “can only occur with informed exercise of a choice, and
that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowingly the options available and the risks attendant
upon each.”).
214 Grimm, supra note 3, at 41.
215 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 828.
216 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005).
217 Id.
218 Id.
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ator impartiality is central to the mediation process.”219 Impartial-
ity is sometimes explained as “multipartial,” in that “mediators are
involved with and concerned about how to help achieve satisfac-
tion of all parties.”220  The salient point here is that mediators
should not behave in ways that favors one party over another.  In-
deed, participants seek impartial mediators because “[t]hey do not
want an intervener who will initiate actions that are potentially det-
rimental to their interests.”221  The role of an advocate is inconsis-
tent with the role of a mediator and, more particularly, in direct
violation of the mediator’s ethical duties of impartiality.
Supporting the idea that mediators cannot be advocates for
mediation participants, the Florida Mediator Qualifications Advi-
sory Panel ruled that mediator may not advise pro se litigants of
the existence of claims of which they may not be aware.222  In that
case, the mediator specifically asked “[i]s a mediator who becomes
aware that a plaintiff in a wrongful death action is making no claim
for loss of consortium, which claim would appear to the mediator
to be appropriate under the circumstances, bound to inform that
party of the matter?”223  The Florida panel explained that not only
was a mediator not bound to make the participant aware of the
unasserted consortium claim, but that ethical rules prohibited the
mediator from advising of the existence of the claim.224  The panel
stated:
No mediator, even one who is a member of the Florida Bar and
theoretically is ‘qualified by training or experience,’ may not in-
form a plaintiff, regardless of whether the plaintiff is repre-
sented or not, of a right to make a claim for loss of consortium
because that would be in the nature of providing legal advice,
not merely providing information (citations omitted).  A lawyer
mediator is specifically precluded from representing either party
during the mediation.225
The Florida mediator ethics panel decision is consistent with the
Model Standards and the proper role of mediators.  Mediators can-
not be advocates for any party in the mediation.  As we will ex-
plore later in this Article, mediators in some circumstances may
ethically provide legal information and raise legal issues as long as
219 WALDMAN, supra note 4, at 141.
220 CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 53 (3rd rev. ed. 2003).
221 Id.
222 Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 96-003 (1997).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.; see also Florida Mediator Qualifications Advisory Panel, MQAP 95-005(c) (1997).
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they do so in the service of all participants.  Now that we have ad-
dressed that requiring informed outcome consent is presently un-
ethical under the Model Standards, we will turn to why changing
mediator ethical codes to impose a duty on mediators to obtain
informed outcome consent of pro se participants is undesirable.
B. Mediator Ethical Codes Should Not Require Informed
Outcome Consent Because It Is Inconsistent with the
Proper Role of the Mediator and Would Create
Significant Practical Concerns
1. Mediator Codes Should Not Require Informed Consent
Because it Undermines the Mediation Process
A system of mediation that requires, or even permits,
mediators to provide legal advice that aids one party to the detri-
ment of another eviscerates impartiality.  By eviscerating impartial-
ity, the process can no longer be properly called mediation
because, as we have seen, impartiality is a defining characteristic of
the mediation process.  Professor Nolan-Haley argues for a “modi-
fied approach to mediator neutrality” when courts require unrep-
resented parties to participate in mediation.226  Courts, legislatures
and mediator associations should reject this “modified approach to
neutrality” because it is a euphemism for impartiality and is incon-
sistent with the proper role of mediators.  Professor Nolan-Haley
acknowledges as much when she says that her proposed model
“poses a threat to neutrality, a primary value of mediation.”227  She
justifies this threat to a traditional view of impartiality by arguing
that as a fiduciary to the disputing parties, a mediator has mini-
mum responsibilities to parties to help make their decisions in-
formed ones.228  These minimum responsibilities, she argues,
sometime require a “modified approach to neutrality.”229  Under
such an approach, she explains, “informed decision-making should
not be understood as a competing value, but rather as a prerequi-
site for the exercise of self-determination.”230
Professor Nolan-Haley’s argument that mediators, when nec-
essary, should provide legal advice fails to convince, in part, be-
226 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 837.
227 Id. at 837; Engler, supra note 1, at 2.
228 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 825–26.
229 Id. at 837.
230 Id. at 813.
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cause mediators are not fiduciaries.  Thus, the kind of informed
consent obligation for which she and others argue is not the media-
tor’s proper function.  A “fiduciary,” it is explained, “acts on the
client’s behalf and in service of the client’s welfare in the relevant
domain.”231  As general definition, a “fiduciary is a person en-
trusted with power . . . to be used for the benefit of another and
legally held to the highest standard of conduct.”232  Supporting
Professor Nolan-Haley’s view, one scholar has argued that courts
should impose fiduciary status on mediators because of the confi-
dences and trust that parties typically place in the mediator.233
This scholar reasons that the fiduciary status should attach because
the mediator has a “powerful political position between the two
parties [and] . . . because the “mediator actively seeks to gain the
trust of the parties of the parties in order to maximize
effectiveness.”234
As of this writing, however, no court has deemed mediators as
fiduciaries, and it should remain so because the role of mediator is
inconsistent with the role of a traditional fiduciary.235  In the legal
use of the term, mediators are not fiduciaries at all because by the
very nature of their role they cannot have individualized loyalty, as
might a doctor or a lawyer.236  A mediator’s loyalty is to all of the
parties to a dispute, not just one party.237  Mediators serve the par-
ties by serving the process.238  John Paul Lederach, acclaimed con-
flict resolution scholar, correctly observed that “[a]dvocacy chooses
to stand by one side for justice’s sake.  Mediation chooses to stand
in connection to all sides for justice’s sake.”239  As a supporter of
all sides in mediation, the mediator cannot provide legal counsel to
one side to the detriment of another side, however noble the moti-
vation.  The role that physicians play in promoting their patients’
231 Steven Joffe & Robert D. Truog, Consent to Medical Care: The Importance of the Fiduci-
ary Context, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT 353 (Franklin G. Miller and Alan Wertheimer eds.,
2010).
232 Id.
233 See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role of Fiduciary Duties, 53 U. CIN. L.
REV 731, 744–45 (1984).
234 Id.
235 See Chaykin, supra note 233, at 744-45.
236 See MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005).
237 MOORE, supra note 220, at 81 (stating that a mediation is “‘omnipartial,’ in that mediators
are involved with and concerned about how to help achieve satisfaction of all parties’ issues and
interests.’”).
238 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 30.
239 JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS
CULTURES 14 (1995).
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health is different from the role that mediators play in resolving
their participants’ disputes.  Physicians are caretakers, advisers and
advocates for the patients.  Their relationship to the patient is “fi-
duciary in character.”240  Mediators, on the other hand, do not
serve an individual.241  They are guides, facilitators and educators
for two or more participants in a single conflict.242  Thus, a media-
tor assists a group of individuals with a joint problem and cannot
aid one member of the group to the detriment of any other mem-
ber.243  Unlike a physician, individualized loyalty is not possible, or
desirable, for a mediator because it creates a conflict of loyalties.
Dean Michael Moffitt, another noted ADR Scholar, explains
the inherent conflict if mediators are treated as traditional fiducia-
ries.244  Dean Moffitt says that in establishing a claim that a media-
tor is a fiduciary, a “[p]rospective plaintiff would need to overcome
the structural difficulty of asserting that the mediator owes simulta-
neous fiduciary obligations to parties with opposing interests in the
same matter at hand.”245  “Fiduciary obligations,” he continues,
“cannot be structured responsibly in a way that would damn the
mediator no matter what she did, yet holding a fiduciary obligation
simultaneously to opposing parties risks exactly that.”246  In other
words, if traditional fiduciary obligations applied to mediators, and
mediators were bound to obtain participants’ informed outcome
consent, they could be “damned” by one client for not informing
him of his legal rights before accepting a settlement and be damned
by the other client if he did because he breached his obligation of
impartiality.247
240 FADEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 128; Canterbury, 464 F. 2d at 782.
241 MOORE, supra note 220, at 53.
242 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 25–28.
243 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005).
244 Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 168 (2003).
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005). Even lawyers, one of the most traditional of
fiduciaries, have limits to their fiduciary obligations to one client if it would undermine their
obligations to current or even past clients.  For example, under the American Bar Associations,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, a lawyer under no circumstances can take on a
representation that involves “the assertion of a claim by one client against another client repre-
sented by the lawyer in the same litigation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.7 (b)(3)
(2013).  The rules even protect former clients.  Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules states that “[a]
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which the person’s interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9. (2013).  The Model Rules are
replete with examples of the ways fiduciary obligations are balanced against one another and
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Mediation is a set of characteristics, not just one characteristic,
the same way water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, not one
element or the other element.  As much as one may want to, one
cannot ignore that in some respects, mediation assistance is one
side of the coin and mediator impartiality is the other side.  If one
decides that informed choice is paramount, then impartiality in me-
diation means very little or nothing at all.  It would be like deciding
that a lawyer’s loyalty to the client is paramount in representation,
rendering meaningless the ethical duties of candor to the court and
truthfulness to non-clients.248  Competing ethical duties should not
obliterate one another; they should balance with one another.
2. Requiring Informed Outcome Consent Would Create
Practical Concerns
Imposing a duty on mediators to obtain informed outcome
consent from pro se participants would raise at least two significant
practical concerns that would negatively impact the practice of me-
diation.  The first concern is that it would reduce mediation’s effec-
tiveness because the mediator’s role in advising pro se participant
would cause the other party or parties to lose trust in the mediator.
The second practical concern is that if mediators were required to
provide legal advice, it would prevent non-attorney mediators and
facilitative mediators from mediating disputes in which, at least,
one party was pro se.
Requiring mediators to provide pro se litigants legal advice in
order to obtain informed outcome consent would seriously under-
mine the efficiency of mediation by allowing mediators to treat
participants unequally, potentially damaging the participant’s trust
in the mediator.  A mediator’s currency is trust.249  The extent to
which the parties trust the mediator is the extent to which he or she
will be able to productively guide the process and encourage col-
limited.  Similarly, any fiduciary status that mediators might attain in the future cannot ignore
some key obligations to the exclusions of others.   Even if a court or legislature deemed
mediators fiduciaries, it could not require informed consent as one of the mediator’s fiduciary
obligations because no single obligation should shape mediators duties.  Instead they should be
shaped by all ethical obligations.  Mediators would be able to aid one party in participating in
the mediation process as long as it did not undermine the other party.
248 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013) at Rule 3.3 (stating that a lawyer shall not
knowingly “[m]ake a false statement of fact to a tribunal or fail to correct the false statement of
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer”) and Rule 4.1 (stating that
“in the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of
material fact or law to a third person”).
249 Susan Nauss Exon, Maximizing Technology to Establish Trust in an Online, Non-Visual
Mediation Setting, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 27, 41 (2011).
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laborative behavior and flexibility from the participants.  Uncover-
ing information, generating options, and managing the negotiation
process are all reliant on the parties trust in the mediator.  Thus,
maintaining a high degree of rapport and trust with parties is essen-
tial to an effective mediation.250  A survey conducted of labor and
commercial mediators ranked rapport building as the most impor-
tant ingredient of their success.”251  Rapport building, in part, con-
templates trust.252  A high degree of trust is impossible to maintain
if a mediator appears impartial.253  Internationally recognized me-
diation scholars Laurence Boulle and Miryanna Nesic say that im-
partiality is so integral to the mediation process “[i]t is
inconceivable that parties could waive the requirement that the
mediator act fairly.”254  As a practical matter, waiving mediator im-
partiality is precisely what parties will need to do if the duty of
informed outcome consent is required.
If a state required informed outcome consent in pro se media-
tions, mediators would be obligated to explain this duty, as part of
informed participation consent, to all the participants at the begin-
ning of the mediation.  He would have to explain, therefore, that
he might be required to provide legal advice and counsel to the pro
se party, but not the represented party.  Such an explanation, as
part of the mediator’s opening statement, might go something like
this: I am also obligated to explain to you that before we finalize any
agreement here today, I will need to make certain that you under-
stand the consequences of the proposed agreement.  This means that
I will need to be satisfied not only that you understand your obliga-
tions and benefits under the agreement, but also the legal rights you
may be giving up by entering into it.  In the case of Ms. Smith, who
is representing herself, I may find it necessary to help her understand
the law and how it applies to her case.  This means helping her to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of her claims, as well as bringing
to her attention claims or defenses of which she might not be aware,
but which I think are nevertheless valid.  Many mediation partici-
pants would not agree to this condition, recognizing its obvious
bias.255  Even in circumstances that an opposing counsel and party
250 Id.
251 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 223.
252 Id. (stating that rapport building involves “a relationship of understanding, empathy and
trust.”).
253 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 51.
254 LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 18
(2001).
255 Id.
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are required to submit to such a condition because the mediation is
court-ordered, they will see the impartial treatment and bias in
such a condition, and it will negatively affect their relationship with
the mediator and undermine the mediation process.
A second negative impact of requiring informed outcome con-
sent will be the marginalization of mediators with professional
backgrounds in areas other than law, as well as those mediators
who practice in a facilitative style.  Professor Nolan-Haley hints at
this issue in her article, although does not resolve it.  She states:
“Depending upon the court program in which mediation takes
place, a wide range of legal knowledge may be required and
mediators, whether or not they are lawyers, will not always know
the relevant legal information that should be disclosed to par-
ties.”256  “This is a complex problem,” she continues, “that raises
questions about who should be permitted to mediate in court medi-
ation programs.”257  This problem is not complex, but rather it is
quite simple: If states require informed outcome consent, only at-
torneys will be able to mediate disputes involving pro se parties
because only attorneys can provide legal advice and evaluation.
Mediation is generally not considered the practice of law and
it should remain so.258  Facilitating discussions and problem solv-
ing, discussing “legal issues generally” and even memorializing par-
ties’ settlement terms in writing constitute acts of mediation, not
the practice of law.259  The acts of providing legal advice or evaluat-
ing the strength and weakness of legal claims are the practices of
law, even if provided by a mediator in a mediation.260  Many excel-
lent mediators who are not lawyers successfully practice mediation
without practicing law.261  Psychologists, social workers, business-
people, clergy are all common backgrounds for skilled professional
mediators.  A requirement that mediators be able to provide legal
advice to pro se participants would effectively preclude these
highly skilled professionals from mediating legal disputes when one
or more of the participants represent themselves.
256 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 837.
257 Id.
258 See Resolution on Mediation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, A.B.A. SEC. DISP.
RESOL. (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/resolution2002.pdf.
259 Id.
260 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers
from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 428 (1997).
261 Carole J. Brown, Facilitative Mediation: The Classic Approach Retains Its Appeal, 4 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 279, 290 (2004).
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Facilitative attorney-mediators would be similarly excluded
from mediating legal disputes involving pro se participants if a state
imposed informed outcome consent.  They would be excluded not
because they are legally precluded from giving legal advice, as is
the case with non-lawyers, but because they believe that mediation
is best practiced through less directive methods.  This would be a
terrific blow to the mediation profession.  While it is reasonable to
debate the efficacy of various mediation models, the credibility of
the facilitative model cannot be reasonably questioned, nor should
it be marginalized in the service of transforming mediators into le-
gal practitioners.262
C. “Informed Participation Consent” Should be a Mediator Duty
& the Model Standards Should Codify This Duty
1. Mediators Should Have a Duty of Informed
Participation Consent
Although this Article concludes that we should not impose a
duty of informed outcome consent on mediators, we should impose
a duty of informed participation consent because it is consistent
with a mediator’s ethical duties and enhances the quality of the
mediation process. As explained earlier in this Article, participa-
tion consent encourages “a conscious, knowledgeable decision to
enter into the mediation process.”263  Participation consent is an
important concept in mediation because, as we will examine below,
mediation is practiced in so many different styles and forms that if
the mediator does not explain her style of mediation, mediation
participants, including lawyers, could agree to participate in a pro-
cess that is very different from the one they expected.264  Yet, the
Model Standards refers only obtusely to informed process consent
and most state mediation ethics codes do not refer to it at all.265
Moreover, informed process consent is more analogous to the ori-
gins of informed consent in the physician–patient context and is
consistent with the mediator’s role as an impartial neutral.
262 Id.
263 Love et al., supra note 4, at 54.
264 Kimberlee Kovach & Lela Love, “Evaluative” Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNA-
TIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG., 31, 32 (1996).
265 Susan Nauss Essex, How can a Mediator be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Stan-
dards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, J. DISP. RESOL, 387, 405 (2006).
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People use the term “mediation” to describe a great number
of different strategies and techniques that an impartial third party
uses in resolving disputes.266  However, the term “mediation” more
accurately refers to not one process, but in fact to many different
dispute resolution processes that loosely fall under the broader
term “mediation.”267  In the medical context, this is akin to a physi-
cian using the term “appendectomy” to refer to the removal of a
person’s appendix, but it does not denote the method of removal.
A physician could remove an appendix laparoscopically, a mini-
mally invasive procedure, or through an open operation that is
more invasive and typically comes with a longer recovery period
and different risks.268  The term “mediation” is even broader in
what processes to which it could refer.  Three commonly used me-
diation models are facilitative, evaluative and transformative.269
There are even more models of mediation, albeit lesser known,
such as “narrative” and “through understanding.”270  Although
there is considerable overlap in the techniques used among models,
and mediators are often eclectic in their style, drawing from more
than one model, distinct mediation styles have their attendant risks
and benefits.271  Good mediation practice dictates that parties to
mediation should knowingly assume these risks and benefits in the
same way that person a about to have his appendix removed
should know whether he or she will be in the hospital a week or
only two days, and whether he will have a six inch scar on his side
or a half inch scar.272  Because of the great scope of activities, strat-
egies, and techniques contemplated in the term “mediation,”
mediators must explain details about the process to participants
266 Henikoff et al., supra note 22, at 93.
267 Id.
268 M. Khoursheed, W. Sobhi, K. Al-Sharaf, S. Aman, A. Behbehani, & H. Dashti, The Intro-
duction of Laparoscopic Appendectomy in a Teaching Hospital, MEDICAL PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE (1999), https://www.karger.com/Article/Pdf/26084; BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at
12–13.
269 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12–13.
270 JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, PRACTICING NARRATIVE MEDIATION 3 (2008) (Nar-
rative mediation emphasizes the importance of decoding the stories that participants tell as a
way to identify problems giving rise to the dispute.); Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein,
Resolving Conflict Together: The Understanding-Based Model of Mediation 2006 J. DISP. RESOL.
523, 524–25 (2006) (As the name of the model suggests, this style of mediation emphasizes the
importance of fully understanding the complexity of the dispute which includes the parties’ per-
sonal and business issues, as well as the legal issue.  Parties have the responsibility for their own
decisions and the mediation is conducted without private meetings with the mediators.).
271 See Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature
and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 287 (2001).
272 Henikoff et al., supra note 22, at 9.
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before the mediation so that participants can make educated deci-
sions about their willingness to participate in it.273
An examination of the basic differences between the two most
prevalent mediation models, facilitative and evaluative, will
demonstrate why participation consent is essential.  The term “me-
diation” could refer to both an evaluative mediator who will assist
the parties with their dispute by assessing strengths and weaknesses
of the merits of their arguments.274  The term “mediation” also in-
cludes a facilitative mediator who assists the parties with their dis-
pute by structuring parties’ communication to best promote
dialogue and a better understanding of the dispute.275  Despite de-
bate among mediators and mediator scholars over the appropriate-
ness of using evaluation as a tool in mediation, the Model
Standards allow the use of evaluation.  The clause that “a mediator
may provide information that the mediator is qualified by training
or experience to provide” was a way the drafters avoided deciding
the issue of the appropriateness of evaluation in mediation.276  Yet,
facilitative mediation and evaluative mediation are very different
processes, despite being called by the same name and each has its
strengths, weakness, and associated risks.
A facilitative mediator strives to comprehensively and jointly
define problems while helping the parties to better understand
their needs and concerns and to avoid the common pitfalls of prob-
lem solving.277  “The central quality of mediation,” says Professor
Lon Fuller in his classic statement on the topic, “[is] its capacity to
reorient the parts to each other . . . by helping them to achieve a
new shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect attitudes and dispositions toward one another.”278
Facilitative mediators “do not provide opinions about the quality
of settlement options, although they may through questioning, and
other techniques, assist the parties in evaluating the settlement op-
tions for themselves.”279  For example, to help a plaintiff in an em-
ployment discrimination suit look more realistically at a damage
273 Id.
274 Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron, Using Evaluation in Mediation, 52 DISP.
RESOL. J. 26, 27 (1997).
275 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12–13.
276 Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice!, Give Thanks, and Sing, ABA, ACR and AAA
Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN J. L. 195, 217–18
(1997).
277 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12–13.
278 Lon Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL L. REV 305, 325 (1971).
279 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 13.
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request, a more facilitative mediator might ask the plaintiff to
break down the damage request into it constituent categories and
discuss the evidence he has for each, such as back pay, front pay,
and pain and suffering.  Asking a plaintiff to support each compo-
nent of damage request with facts, even without evaluating those
facts, frequently reveals weakness and gaps in the plaintiff’s de-
mands, making them more flexible in the settlement figure.280
The evaluative mediator, on the other hand, is more directive
in his approach to resolving the dispute.  He or she will “express[ ]
an opinion as to the likely outcome or value of a legal claim or
defense were it to be adjudicated.”281  If a plaintiff makes a damage
request that the mediator finds unsupportable, an evaluative medi-
ator will explain why it is unsupportable and unlikely to be ob-
tained in adjudication.282
Facilitative and evaluative mediation also have their benefits
and risks, as do any other dispute resolution processes.  Facilitative
mediation puts a premium on the value of parties arriving at their
own solution to their mutual problem.283  With the aid of the
facilitative mediator as a process expert, parties are empowered to
fully participate in the process of mediation and the mediated
agreement.284  This type of mediation “values the parties’ sense of
fairness in the mediation context over fairness embodied in public
norms.”285  One risk of facilitative mediation is that the solution
might not be optimal.286  Parties may simply not choose the best
solution because of their inexperience with these types of disputes.
Another risk of this process is that a mediator will not explain the
law to unrepresented parties or ill-prepared lawyers.287  Con-
versely, the evaluative process will provide the parties with at least
one perspective of the likely adjudicated outcome.288  This could
make them more informed and consequently more powerful in the
negotiation with their mediation counterpart.  However, there are
many potential downsides to using evaluative techniques.  The me-
diator may lose his effectiveness because his evaluation favored
280 See FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 236–37.
281 Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
282 See id.
283 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 73–74.
284 Id.
285 WALDMAN, supra note 4, at 145 (comments by Lela Love, contributor).
286 See FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 73–74.
287 See Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
288 Id.
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one side over another, thereby alienating one party.289  The evalua-
tion may unduly affect the assessment by one party, especially an
unrepresented party, influencing them to make a decision that
might be best under the law, but not best for the party overall.
This undermines party self-determination.  Finally, the mediator
might be wrong in their evaluation.290
Informed participation consent is exactly the type of educated
decision-making mediators can ethically promote for all parties
and is most analogous to traditional informed consent law in the
physician-patient context.  Like a patient about to undergo a rec-
ommended medical procedure, a litigant about to enter a dispute
resolution procedure—mediation—has the right to know risks and
benefits of that process as that mediator practices it.  Physicians
and mediators are “skilled helpers,” assisting people in solving
problems.291  Physicians help people solve medical problems;
mediators help people solve legal, social and business problems,
sometimes in the same dispute.  Physicians and mediators alike
give the desires, concerns and goals of the people in their care the
utmost consideration and respect.  They also strive to promote, and
are bound to honor, the decisions of their patients and clients in an
environment that empowers them to make these decisions volunta-
rily, uncoerced, and as informed as possible.292  To that end, both
physicians and mediators provide process information as part of
their service.
In the physician-patient context, the courts imposed on physi-
cians a requirement to explain to patients the benefits, detriments
and risks associated with medical procedure and mediators should
be similarly bound.  When the Mohr court faulted a physician for
operating on the patient’s left ear when she had given consent only
to operate on her right ear, it established two pillars of informed
consent policy: self-determination and the right to understand the
risks and benefits before consenting to undergo a procedure.293
The Salgo court further advanced this particular form of consent,
when a patient became paralyzed after undergoing a spine opera-
tion in circumstances where the risk of paralysis was not ade-
quately communicated.294  The Salgo court stressed that the patient
289 Love et al., supra note 4, at 58.
290 Id.
291 See GERARD EGAN, THE SKILLED HELPER 3 (8th ed. 2007).
292 MODEL STANDARDS Standard I (2005).
293 Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (1905).
294 Salgo v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957).
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needed to know that “nature, consequences, harms, benefits, risks,
and alternatives to a proffered treatment . . . in order to know what
they are choosing.”295  The Canterbury court further emphasized
the role self-determination plays in informed consent.  The Canter-
bury court stated that it is “the prerogative of the patient, not the
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his inter-
ests seem to lie.  To enable the patient to chart his course under-
standably,” the court continued, “some familiarity with the
therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes essential.”296
In all of these instances, the court was concerned with the patient’s
understanding of the procedure, not the actual outcome of the pro-
cedure.  As discussed above, different forms of mediation have dif-
ferent concrete benefits and risks associated with them, even
though they are called by the same name—mediation.  Simply put,
parties should understand these risks and benefits before entering
the mediation process.  To not inform parties of the process in
which they are about to engage is not only unfair to the party, but
also undermines public confidence in mediation.297
2. The Model Standards Should Incorporate the Mediator’s
Duty of Participation Consent
The Model Standards provide insufficient guidance as to the
role of informed consent in mediation and should be amended to
require mediators to obtain informed participation consent.  The
Model Standards contain two provisions that allude to informed
consent, although it uses the more ambiguous term “informed
choices.”  In the first provision, requiring that the mediator con-
duct the process “based on the principle of self-determination,” it
states that “[s]elf determination is the act of coming to a voluntary,
uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed
choices as to process and outcome.”298  The second allusion to in-
formed consent states that a “mediator cannot personally ensure
that each party has made a free and informed choices to reach par-
ticular decisions, but, where appropriate, a mediator should make
the parties aware of the importance of consulting other profession-
als to help them make informed choices.”299  It seems that what the
295 FADEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 126.
296 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
297 Kovach & Love, supra note 264, at 31.
298 MODEL STANDARDS Standard I A (2005).
299 Id. at Standard I A 2 (2005).
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first clause gives, the second clause takes away, leaving mediators
confused as to the proper role of informed consent in mediation.
Although the Model Standards state that the mediator should
encourage self-determination, which in part it defines as including
the participants’ process consent, it imposes no clear duty on
mediators to explain the mediation process.  This has been a prob-
lem in the Model Standards since its first iteration in 1994.  Criticiz-
ing the code not long after its original publication, and recognizing
that mediators’ styles can differ dramatically, two scholars com-
mented “[i]nstead of helping the parties to understand the differ-
ences between mediators and the costs and benefits  of using
different types of mediators, the Model Standards imply that all
mediators perform essentially the same functions.”300  These schol-
ars go on rightly to explain that “with this information, the parties
could make an informed decision as to the various services that
different mediators provide.”301
It would be neither difficult nor revolutionary for the Model
Standards to require mediators explicitly to obtain informed partic-
ipation consent before the mediation process.  It is common for
mediator training courses to teach their students to explain to par-
ticipants the nature of the particular mediation process that they
are about to enter.302  For example, one standard mediation text
explains that, during the mediator’s opening statement, the media-
tor should “describe the key elements of the mediation process and
explain their purpose in understandable terms, so that the partici-
pants, if they have not already done so, can make an informed de-
cision whether to participate.”303  Moreover, other mediation
ethical codes impose such a requirement.  For example, the Massa-
chusetts Mediator Code states that “the neutral shall make every
reasonable effort to ensure that each party to the dispute resolu-
tion process . . . understands the nature and character of the pro-
cess . . . .”304  While the Massachusetts code is a vast improvement
over the Model Standards, an even more desirable clause would
also include a requirement that the mediator explain the benefits,
detriments and risks associated with his own mediation style.
Some scholars have argued that explaining the risks and benefits of
300 Henikoff et al., supra note 22, at 9.
301 Id.
302 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 66–67 (“The mediator’s opening should also explain to
the parties the particular process that will be followed.”).
303 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 129.
304 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 1:18, sec 9(c) (2006).
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one’s mediator style is particularly appropriate when a mediator
might offer “an evaluation or opinion on the merits of a legal ques-
tions,” because of the particular risks associated with that style of
mediation.305  This is, of course, good policy, but it should be even
broader in scope.
All mediation styles have associated benefits, costs and risks
and this information should be explained to participants by all
mediators, regardless of style, not just when the mediator is using
an evaluative mediation style.  Thus, an informed participation
consent clause might read as follows: Mediators shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that participants understand the nature and
character of the mediation process, including the benefits, costs and
risks associated with the particular model or models of mediation to
be employed.  This will allow the participant to enter the processes
in a truly informed way but will also provide guidance on how they
can most productively participate in the process into which they
are about to engage.
Informed participation consent enhances informed outcome
consent.  Mediation participants should be considered to have
given informed outcome consent as long as they understand the
nature of the process and the attendant benefits, detriments and
risks of resolving the dispute through whatever mediation process
that they have agreed to enter.  “Once adequately warned, parties
are deemed to have assumed the risk voluntarily if they consent
and hence the responsibility for the consequences of their
choice.”306
In determining “adequate warning,” the Model Standards
should adopt a participant-centered standard of care to determine
whether the mediator has fulfilled this obligation.  In borrowing
from the patient-centered approach first articulated by the Canter-
bury court, the legal adequacy of the mediator’s information im-
parted as part of participation consent should be judged by what a
“reasonably prudent” mediation participant “has every right to ex-
pect.”307  As explained by the Canterbury court, a patient-centered
approach to informed consent provides real oversight of profes-
sional conduct.  A professional practice approach, conversely, al-
lows professionals to establish customs for themselves that can
remain inviolate by courts simply because the practice is common
305 Love et al., supra note 4, at 45–46, 66.
306 Id. at 55.
307 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F. 2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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among professional, not because it is adequate.308  If this argument
was sufficient to adopt a participant-centered approach in the med-
ical context, assessing the adequacy of participation consent from
the participant’s perspective is even more appropriate in media-
tion.  Professional mediation is still a developing field.  Most
mediators possess little formal training, guidance, or supervision.309
Thus, unlike the medical profession, mediator practice is still too
diverse and often too uninformed for “custom” to provide ade-
quate protection to mediation participants.
The history of informed consent is about consent to a process
not an outcome.  Mediators can explain the form of mediation they
practice, the same way a physician can explain the form of appen-
dectomy they believe is appropriate under the present circum-
stances.  Most importantly, mediators can explain their particular
process to participants while also maintaining impartiality.  There-
fore, mediator legislative and ethical codes should codify and clar-
ify scope of informed consent duties to require participation
consent.
V. PRESERVING MEDIATOR IMPARTIALITY WHILE PROMOTING
INFORMED CONSENT
Pro se litigants face significant obstacles when embroiled in
legal disputes either as plaintiffs or defendants that often diminish
their chances of obtaining justice in our legal system.310  This prob-
lem is one of the most significant issues our legal system today con-
fronts and worsens each year.311 Pro se litigants face these
obstacles not only when advocating in the courts and when negoti-
ating claims on their own behalf, but also when participating in me-
308 Id. at 784.
309 Geetha Ravindra, Is Mediation a Profession, 15 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 7 (2009) (“Only a few
states (such as Virginia, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina) have specific qualifications re-
quired for one to identify oneself as a court-referred mediator.  These state qualifications vary
widely.  There is great variation in the content and quality of the mediation training programs
that are offered.  Often, oversight of mediation trainers is limited.  Several colleges, universities,
and law schools offer mediation-related courses, but very few mediation practitioners hold a
graduate degree in conflict resolution.”).
310 Laura K. Abel, The Role of Speech Regarding Constraints on Attorney Performance: An
Institutional Design Analysis, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 181, 207 (2012).
311 James Podgers, Sustaining Justice 10 Experts Tell How Courts Can Do More with Less,
A.B.A. J., June 2011, at 34, 57 (As the economic situation worsens, the number of pro se litigants
increases, creating extra fees for the represented party).
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diation without the benefit of professional legal advice.312
Maximizing fairness in the mediation process, especially for pro se
participants, should be a universal objective of all mediation schol-
ars and practitioners.313
As we have seen above, some scholars propose that the best
way to promote fairly mediated outcomes for pro se participants is
to impose greater accountability on mediators for the substance of
the agreements that they help to facilitate.314  In particular, some
scholars encourage courts and legislatures to impose a duty of in-
formed outcome consent on mediators to “insure that agreements
do not result in the unknowing waiver of rights by unrepresented
parties.”315  While it may seem that providing informed outcome
consent for the mediated settlement agreement for unrepresented
parties would enhance the goal of fairness by helping less sophisti-
cated, pro se parties, as we have seen, a closer examination of the
impact of this practice demonstrates otherwise.  Fairness in media-
tion can be adequately safeguarded through less onerous means
than requiring informed outcome consent.  Mediators have a vari-
ety of facilitative and evaluative tools available to them to em-
power the parties and support them in making more informed
decisions.
A. Facilitative Techniques to Promote Informed Consent and
Self-Determination
A mediator, operating within ethical propriety, can provide
substantial assistance to pro se parties to understand the conse-
quences of a particular settlement.   Indeed, one of the most impor-
tant roles of a mediator is to support participants in making good
decisions about their disputes.316  Mediators can use several differ-
ent kinds of facilitative techniques to promote informed outcome
consent.  These techniques include assisting parties in identifying
312 Cynthia E. Nance, Unrepresented Parties in Mediation, 15 PRAC. LITIGATOR 47 n.3 (2004);
see also Maute, supra note 195, at 505.
313 Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Proce-
dures: Detailed Analysis Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
1, 28 (2006) (by increasing the value to both parties, fairness is also increased throughout the
mediation process).
314 Maute, supra note 195, at 505 (Arguing that mediators should be accountable for “mini-
mally fair substantive outcomes.”).
315 Engler, supra note 1, at 2.
316 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 1.
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relevant information and encouraging the gathering and sharing of
that information.  Mediators can also employ techniques to help
parties more objectively assess that information.  Short of provid-
ing legal advice, mediators can also help parties identify important
gaps in their legal analysis and arguments in ways to help them
better assess the strengths and weakness of their claims and
defenses.
1. Information Gathering
Mediators can enhance the likelihood of informed outcome
decision-making without guaranteeing it by “develop[ing] and ex-
pand[ing] the information base upon which decisions are pre-
mised.”317  Three informational areas that a mediator typically
develops are the factual information, the legal information, and the
parties’ future alternatives.  The value of each of these will be ex-
plored in turn.
The factual information base that the mediator explores and
expands can be divided up into legally relevant facts and non-le-
gally relevant facts. Pro se parties often come to mediation with-
out sufficient factual information to make wise decisions about the
future of their dispute.318  They may not even fully understand the
dispute because people in conflict often cease communicating
shortly after the conflict arises, leaving misunderstanding in its
wake.319  Moreover, in circumstances where the other party is rep-
resented by counsel, it is likely that the attorney has not shared all
of the relevant information because lawyers frequently view shar-
ing information as harmful to their case.320  Discovery is answered
in the narrowest possible fashion, and it is often surprising how
much important information is not yet fully understood by one or
more participants even when discovery is complete.321  Thus, the
first job of a mediator is to examine the information upon which a
317 WALDMAN, supra note 4, at 139 (commentary by Lela Love).
318 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Profes-
sional Monopoly from A Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 235, 282 (2002)
(parties without sufficient knowledge cannot make educated decisions).
319 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 161 (stating that “[p]eople involved in difficult disputes
often suffer from communication breakdowns”).
320 DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES 124–25 (2009).
321 Id.
2014] INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION 755
party, especially a pro se party, bases his or her claim or defense
and then seek to expand that information base when possible.322
Questioning is one of the primary tools mediators use to not
only understand the conflict for themselves, but also for them to
assess and expand the factual information for the party so that set-
tlement decisions can be made on as complete and information
base as possible.323  After a party has related their version of the
dispute, usually in the party’s opening statement, the mediator ei-
ther in joint sessions or separate meetings can ask the party to pro-
vide more detail about aspects of the dispute that the mediator
believes are particularly relevant.324  Let us look at an example of a
dispute where a landlord is attempting to evict a tenant for non-
payment of rent and the tenant is justifying non-payment because
the apartment remained unheated for “much” of December.  Here,
the mediator would ask a series of questions to try to get an accu-
rate view of how many days in December the heat was unavailable
and what times of day it occurred, as this information will be rele-
vant to the claim’s merits.
Mediators also use questioning to help to identify and fill in
gaps to a dispute narrative.325  For example, in a case where a sup-
plier failed timely to deliver produce to a restaurant and the restau-
rant sued the produce supplier for breach of contract, the
restaurant owner might not know why the supplier failed to deliver
the produce.  This information might be important from a legal
perspective because there are legal excuses for non-performance,
like lack of payment or act of God.  Information might also be rele-
vant from a humanistic perspective even though it is meaningless
to the legal merits of the claim.  For example, the produce supplier
might have failed to deliver because of a sudden and tragic death
of a loved one.  While this might not legally excuse non-perform-
ance of the contract, settlement might be easier if the restaurant
owner knows that there was a credible situational reason for non-
performance.  Mediators provide a valuable service through the
mere act of helping parties to identify areas that require more de-
322 Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the
Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 998 (2007) (pro se litigants’ needs and strengths are
determined and recommendations are made).
323 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 132–35.
324 DOUGLAS N. FRANKEL & JAMES H. STARK, THE PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 162 (2008).
325 Paris R. Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the Alj in Assisting the Pro Se
Litigant, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447, 478 (2007) (asking questions to get more
specific information).
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tail and to fill in information gaps.326  Parties often gloss over cer-
tain facts not because they do not know them, but rather because
they did not believe them to be particularly relevant to resolving
their dispute.327  Coaxing out of disputants greater factual detail
allows parties greater factual context to make decisions that are
more informed about whether and how to settle a dispute.328
Sometimes the parties are unaware of potentially important
factual details or gaps. Here the mediator can help in two ways.
First, the mediator can explore ways that the party can uncover
potentially relevant information for themselves.329  In the case of
the tenant who withheld rent because the landlord allegedly did
not provide heat for some portion of December, the mediator may
be able to get a more detailed picture of how often the apartment
was without heat by collecting information from other family mem-
bers in the home or speaking with neighbors in the building who
might have had the same problem.  These might seem like obvious
things to do before a mediation or court proceeding to a mediator
or lawyer, but many pro se litigants have never been litigants
before and frequently are unsophisticated when it comes to the
idea of proving one’s claims.330  Often the information they need to
make better decisions is accessible but simply not accessed.
Another means of improving parties’ information base, and
thereby their settlement decisions, is to encourage parties to share
information.331  Parties often enter mediation with an “asymmetry”
of information, meaning that one party knows more about the dis-
pute, or some aspect of the dispute than the other party or par-
ties.332  For example, in medical negligence litigation, the plaintiff
will often have more detailed information about the medical dam-
ages than the defendant because he or she has lived with those
consequences.  On the other hand, the defendant-physician and
326 Id. (asking questions to get more specific information).
327 Engler, And Justice for All, supra note 8, at 2029 (judges help determine the relevant facts
of a case that might be overlooked otherwise).
328 See Stulberg, supra note 61, at 224 (discussing the importance of questions in mediation).
329 William A. Blancato, C. Allen Gibson, Jr., Controlling Your Own Destiny: You Can with
Mediation, DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 19 (2008).
330 Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negoti-
ations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. R. 79, 109 (1997) (stating that in landlord-
tenant disputes, “ninety percent of tenants do not have lawyers and many—who may not speak
English, much less know their rights—are bullied into signing agreements” when in bilateral
negotiations).
331 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 124–25.
332 Jim Hilbert, Collaborative Lawyering: A Process for Interest-Based Negotiation, 38 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1083, 1090 (2010).
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healthcare provider often know more about the facts surrounding
the alleged negligence because they are in control of the witnesses
and documents, even where there has been discovery.  Part of a
mediator’s role is not only to uncover facts that seem relevant to
settlement, but also to encourage parties to share that informa-
tion.333  This is especially true where discovery is incomplete, as is
often the case when mediation occurs.334  To properly assess a set-
tlement, parties should know as much about the facts of the dispute
as possible.335
An excellent example of the importance of encouraging shar-
ing of information in improving party settlement decisions is found
in a wonderful mediation training video called Mediators at Work,
Breach of Warranty, which is mediated by Professor David Hoff-
man of Harvard Law School.336  This simulated dispute concerns
the legal action by a trucking company for breach of warranty
against its antifreeze supplier, alleging that the antifreeze corroded
engine hoses in their trucks.337  This resulted in damage to the en-
gines of several trucks, and the diminution in value of those trucks
that received the antifreeze but have not yet failed, but might nev-
ertheless have suffered damage that has not yet materialized.338
The plaintiff believes that he has a strong case because he thinks he
will be able to obtain a res ipsa loquitur charge from the judge that
would shift the burden of proof to the defendant.339  Plaintiff be-
lieves this because, based on review of the facts, the engines of all
the trucks that received the antifreeze failed, and those trucks that
didn’t receive the antifreeze showed no signs of problems.340  Thus,
the res ipsa loquitur instruction would shift the burden proof to the
defendant concerning liability, considerably increasing the likeli-
hood of a success at trial.341  However, it seems that a more careful
review of the trucks’ maintenance records, performed indepen-
dently by the defendants, revealed that some of the engines of
trucks that did not receive the questionable antifreeze also failed in
333 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 148.
334 Lavinia E. Hall, Eric Green: Finding Alternatives to Litigation in Business Disputes, in
WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 279, 281 (Deborah M. Kolb et al. eds., 2001).
335 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 125–26.
336 Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron, Mediators at Work, Breach of Warranty, PRO-
JECT ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/
shop/category/audio-cd/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 Id.
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exactly the same way those trucks that did receive the antifreeze.342
This raised a credible question of whether the engine problems
might be caused by something other than the defendant’s anti-
freeze, thereby eliminating the possibility of a res ipsa loquitur
charge and strengthening the defense’s case.343
Despite the fact that revealing this information strengthened
its case, defendants were at first reluctant to reveal it to plaintiff in
the mediation.344  It was only through the mediator’s efforts of en-
couraging the defendant to share this information and explaining
that absent this knowledge the plaintiff will think it has a stronger
case that it actually does, and, consequently, finding a mutually ac-
ceptable settlement value would be unlikely.345  As odd as it may
seem, a party may be reluctant to share information in mediation
that can help their case.346  This reluctance arises from the com-
mon, but mistaken belief that sharing any information in a negotia-
tion risks weakening one’s bargaining position.347
342 Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron, Mediators at Work, Breach of Warranty, PRO-
JECT ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, available at http://www.pon.harvard.edu/
shop/category/audio-cd/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 124–25 (Professor Golann explains that “it is surprising how
little parties know about each other’s cases, even after years of litigation. . . . Discovery rules are
intended to give each side near-complete disclosure of the facts, but often this does not hap-
pen—in part because litigants conceal evidence as much as possible.”).
347 ROY J. LEWICKI, BRUCE BARRY, DAVID M. SAUNDERS & JOHN W. MILTON, NEGOTIA-
TION 80–81 (4th ed. 2003).  One of the most extreme examples of a reluctance to share essential
information in a mediation that this Author has encountered as a mediator was in a dispute
involving an alleged violation of a non-compete agreement.  The plaintiff alleged that one of its
former sales representatives that went to work for a competitor solicited business from a client
listed in a non-compete agreement that the sales person had signed with her former employer.
The plaintiff arrived at the mediation with a completed motion for an order to show cause, with
supporting documents, that it said it would file with the court the next morning if the mediation
was unsuccessful in order to prevent any further contact between the sales person and their
client.  Principals for the defendant explained to the mediator in a private session that it had no
knowledge of contacting the plaintiff’s client and that its salesperson denied making any such
solicitation.  Because of this, they deemed the lawsuit an intimidation tactic by a large company
against a smaller one.  In a separate meeting with the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff showed the
mediator a signed affidavit by the plaintiff’s client that the unlawful solicitation had indeed oc-
curred, providing credible detail of the conversation with date and time.  Although the plaintiff
planned to file this affidavit in support of its motion for an order to show cause in a mere twenty-
four hours if the mediation did not result in a settlement, the plaintiff refused to show the affida-
vit to the defendant and refused to allow the mediator to reveal the contents of the affidavit or
the identity of the client allegedly solicited.  Obviously, in a case like this, where the defendant
believes the lawsuit is frivolous and the plaintiff refuses to supply any concrete evidence of
breach of contract, a mediated settlement is unlikely.  It took nearly an hour of encouragement
from this Author as mediator and a complex negotiation between the parties to arrive at a solu-
2014] INFORMED CONSENT IN MEDIATION 759
2. Assisting in Objective Information Assessment
Nearly as valuable in helping parties to share information is
helping them to assess the meaning and value of the information
that is already available to them.  The confirming evidence trap,
sometimes referred to as selective perception, is one of the most
common decision-making traps to which mediation participants fall
prey.348  As the concept’s name suggests, people overemphasize the
importance of facts (and law, too) that support the view of the
world they wish to maintain and minimize or ignore the facts and
law that undermine that preferred view.349  This is a well-docu-
mented phenomenon and one that mediators can assist the parties
in overcoming.
The most relevant psychological mechanism that causes selec-
tive perception is cognitive dissonance.350  Cognitive dissonance “is
a state of tension that occurs whenever a person holds two cogni-
tions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically in-
consistent.”351  This tension, depending on the degree of
dissonance, causes varying degrees of psychological discomfort,
and humans are driven to reduce this discomfort.352  One common
way litigants and lawyers reduce this discomfort in lawsuits is to
emphasize facts that support a particular view of the case.353  For
instance, if an employee believes that his employer wrongfully ter-
minated him, the employee might focus on the fact that the com-
pany has no minority in management positions and minimize the
fact that his employee performance reviews for the last two years
have been below average.  Conversely, the employer accused of il-
legal employment discrimination might emphasize the employee’s
poor performance reviews and minimize that it does little minority
tion.  The solution was that the defendant’s lawyer would be allowed to review the affidavit with
the agreement that she could not share the details of the affidavit with her client, but would
nevertheless see proof of an alleged violation and thus the seriousness of the situation.  The
Plaintiffs suggested that by revealing their client to defendant they would lose the element of
surprise during the hearing, allowing defendants to fabricate a reason for improperly contacting
their client, even though plaintiffs couldn’t seem to offer a reason that might bolster the de-
fense’s position.  Only through encouraging the parties to share this information was this lawsuit
settled.
348 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 129–30.
349 JOHN S. HAMMOND, RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, SMART CHOICES 194–95
(1999).
350 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 204.
351 CAROL TAVERIS & ELLIOT AARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE, BUT NOT BY ME 13
(2007); JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, FIFTY YEARS OF CLASSIC THEORY 6–7 (2007).
352 COOPER, supra note 351, at 7.
353 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 129.
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hiring despite having a diverse employee applicant pool.  What is
important to note about selective perception is that it is often un-
conscious.354  Cognitive dissonance theory is about “how and why
people unintentionally blind themselves so that they fail to notice
vital events and information that might make them question their
behavior or the convictions.”355  “Naı¨ve realism” is the term scien-
tists use to describe humans’ propensity to use confirmation bias,
as well as other cognitive mechanisms, to trick themselves into ar-
riving at the “inescapable conviction that we perceive the objects
and events clearly.”356
Mediators have several tools at their disposal to mitigate, if
not eliminate, naı¨ve realism that results from confirmation bias.
Most importantly, mediators can make sure that the factual per-
ceptions and arguments from each side are heard and understood
and, if necessary, repeated and/or summarized by the mediator.357
Alternatively, the mediator can ask a party to “summarize the
other side’s key points.”358  By simply emphasizing facts in media-
tion, it will be harder for parties to minimize or ignore them.359  For
example, having the employer that is charged with discrimination
go through their minority hiring record in detail will often be suffi-
cient to provide greater weight to the employer’s assessment of the
merits in the dispute.
Another effective way for mediators to help parties see facts
more objectively is to “review the facts and arguments with each
side in private gently questioning them about apparent gaps.”360
This is a form of “reality testing,” a common and effective media-
tor technique for empowering the parties to more objectively as-
sess the equities of a dispute.361  For example, in a dispute between
a landlord and tenant over the tenant’s alleged repair of a heating
system, a mediator might ask for repair receipts that would support
the damage claim.  If the tenant cannot produce those receipts, a
mediator could ask the tenant for arguments that the landlord
might make at trial because of the tenant’s lack of evidence.362  The
354 TAVERIS ET AL., supra note 351, at 4.
355 Id. at 42.
356 Id.
357 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 204.
358 Id. at 130 (Professor Golann also suggests “encourag[ing] parties to speak, “us[ing] charts
and other visual aids” and repeating facts using different phrasing).
359 See id.
360 Id. at 204.
361 Id. at 27.
362 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 187.
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mediator could further ask what a judge is likely to do without re-
pair receipts or other evidence of the cost of heating repairs.  With-
out ever directly evaluating the lack of evidence, mediators,
through employment of thoughtful questions, can force a party to
think more objectively about facts or evidence, helping the party to
make more informed decisions about settlement.363
Finally, if the parties reach an agreement, mediators can and
should ensure that the parties understand the terms of the agree-
ment.  This does not mean that mediators should be guarantors
that the parties have made informed settlement decisions and un-
derstand the rights that they may have waived by agreeing to a
settlement.  As stated previously, if the mediator has provided ade-
quate participation consent, parties are already informed that set-
tlement comes with risks.  Short of informed outcome consent,
however, mediators can and should “test[ ] the part[ies’] compre-
hension of the terms and the consequences of the agreement.”364
When ensuring that the parties understand the settlement agree-
ment and its consequences, mediators have a “heightened duty” to
pro se participants to make sure that the explanation is understand-
able to them.365  For example, in the landlord-tenant dispute dis-
cussed above over non-payment of rent over lack of heat, the
tenant should understand what payment obligation, if any, he has
and when and how that obligation must be fulfilled.  Moreover, the
landlord should understand the obligations he has to remedy the
problem.  Also, both should know that settlement would extinguish
the present lawsuit.  To accomplish this the mediator might need to
spend more time with the pro se participant and use different ex-
planatory language to make certain that he or she understands the
terms of settlement.  This is not acting impartially because the mes-
sage, intent and effect are the same, to make certain that both par-
ties understand and agree to the terms of the settlement to which
they have explicitly agreed.  This kind of consent benefits both
parties.
3. Promoting an Understanding of the Law
Facilitative mediators, including lawyers and other profession-
als, have the ability to guide parties to a fuller, more accurate un-
derstanding of the legal principles that affect their dispute, thereby
363 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 67–68 (explaining the use of justification questions in
mediation).
364 Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection of Mediation, 41 FLA L. REV. 253, 284 (1989).
365 Love et al., supra note 4, at 64.
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promoting informed outcome consent.  To do this, however,
mediators must have a general sense of the relevant law in the dis-
pute over which they preside.  A mediator must have both media-
tion process knowledge and a minimal degree of substantive
knowledge about the dispute.366  Substantive knowledge may be le-
gal knowledge if the law is relevant, like in the case of proving
illegal employment discrimination.  Substantive knowledge might
also be industry knowledge, such as understanding industry prac-
tices in commercial construction projects in a dispute over the con-
tractor deviating from the construction plans.  To be effective, a
mediator might need both legal and industry knowledge.367  Even
though a facilitative mediator would not use this substantive
knowledge to make explicit evaluations as part of the mediation
process, he or she will need to possess this substantive knowledge
to effectively participate in and shape the parties’ negotiation in
productive ways.368
One way a mediator productively can shape the negotiation
and help parties attain a better appreciation of the legal principles
is by “ask[ing] questions that might be helpful or prob[ing] the
plausibility or desirability of party claims.”369  These are sometimes
called “justification questions” and are a common and helpful cate-
gory of questions that a mediator uses to emphasize the impor-
tance of legal rules that might be relevant to resolving the
dispute.370  An example of a justification question is “what legally
justifies you from withholding rent?”  Or, the mediator might ask
an unrepresented landlord “if the tenant can prove that the heat
was not working for half the month, on what legal basis will you be
able to evict the tenant?”  Without providing legal information or
analysis, the mediator is signaling the importance of legal rules in
the dispute.  In some instances, the pro se parties will be able to
answer these questions credibly because even without the aid of an
attorney, they have been able to prepare well for the mediation.
The mediator, in these circumstances, can gain a comfort level that
they are reasonably well informed to make choices about settle-
ment.  In cases in which the parties cannot adequately respond to
366 Stulberg, supra note 58, at 841.
367 Id.
368 Stulberg, supra note 61, at 241.  This does not mean that a mediator needs to be a lawyer
to mediate legal issues.  A mediator in this circumstance would need to be familiar enough with
the law to follow the conversation and to ask questions that will help the parties think more
objectively about the dispute.
369 Stulberg, supra note 58, at 841.
370 STULBERG ET AL., supra note 17, at 67.
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these questions, the mediator has done them a service in helping to
isolate important gaps in their legal knowledge that will make set-
tlement riskier and adjudication riskier still.
If the mediator helps to identify important gaps in legal infor-
mation, she can provide the additional service of encouraging par-
ties to fill in those gaps before making settlement decisions or
proceeding to adjudication.  The Model Standards state that a me-
diator can advise parties “of the importance of consulting other
professionals to help them make informed choices.”371  For pro se
participants, however, this advice is hollow comfort because in
most cases if the litigant could afford counsel they would have
counsel.372  That said, in a small minority of circumstances, the fact
that the mediator highlighted the importance of legal knowledge in
effectively resolving the dispute might motivate some pro se par-
ticipants to expend more resources and energy in obtaining coun-
sel.  However, for the vast majority of pro se litigants, obtaining
legal counsel is not a realistic option.  This does not necessarily
mean that they cannot get legal information.
Increasingly, credible legal information is available to the pub-
lic at low or no cost.  Without providing legal information,
mediators could emphasize the importance of obtaining it and the
risk associated with not obtaining it.  In many cases, they could also
direct parties to easily obtained resources that could lead to better
settlement choices.  Many courts “have created pro se law clerks,
attorneys, assistants, law clerks or offices to assist unrepresented
litigants.”373  There is also a proliferation of information-sheets,
pamphlets, websites and even kiosks designated for assisting pro se
litigants with common litigation in small claims, landlord-tenant
and family matters where a high percentage of litigants are pro
se.374  Private organizations and academic institutions are also pro-
viding free legal data bases and legal information that are lay user
friendly.375  As the legal market changes, limited representation
and consultation are also available at a fraction of the cost of full
371 MODEL STANDARDS Standard I A (2) (2005).
372 Engler, supra note 1.
373 Id. at 2000.
374 Id.; Self-Help, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA-COUNTY OF ORANGE, http://www.oc
courts.org/self-help (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
375 RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS 44–45 (2013) (citing as an example Cornell
University Law School’s program of publishing legal resources and materials for people to better
understand the law at no charge).
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representation.376  Although these certainly are not equivalent sub-
stitutes for full legal representation, they provide many pro se par-
ties the ability to better inform themselves about legal rights
implicated in the dispute in which they are embroiled, helping
them make more informed decisions.
B. Evaluative Mediation Techniques To Promote
Informed Consent
Short of imposing a duty on mediators to obtain informed con-
sent from pro se litigants, mediators could protect litigants’ legal
rights by strategically and appropriately employing evaluative me-
diation.  As we will see, the distinction between serving as an eval-
uative mediator and serving as a mediator who provides legal
advice for the purpose of obtaining informed consent is sometimes
a subtle one.  Evaluative mediators do provide legal information
and opinions, but they do so evenhandedly to serve both parties,
not for the purpose of aiding one party who lacks legal counsel.
While conducting an evaluative mediation might be objectionable
to some, and certainly not a substitute for legal counsel, it can help
parties make legally informed decisions while honoring mediator
impartiality, if not neutrality.
This author believes, as do many other mediation scholars,
that evaluative mediation if properly implemented “is a legitimate
weapon in the mediator’s arsenal.”377  Yet, evaluative mediation is
a “weapon” that should be used appropriately, cautiously and spar-
ingly because of the many potential risks that it posses to procedu-
ral and outcome fairness.  In their eminently practical article on the
topic, Professors Dwight Golann and Marjorie Corman Aaron con-
vincingly argue that evaluative mediation can be used to overcome
selective perception and advocacy distortion, topics discussed
above, when facilitative methods have been tried and have failed to
reorient the parties.378  They also explain that in some instances an
evaluative mediation can provide a valuable psychological benefit
to a party by providing an assessment of the merits of their case.
This gives the party, at least symbolically, their “day in court.”379
376 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational Contingency of Rights, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1313, 1344 (2012).
377 Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
378 Id. at 27–28.
379 Id.
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There is empirical evidence to support that lawyers and clients
alike value evaluative mediation.  In an extensive study on the per-
ceptions of mediation participants, Professor Tamara Relis found
that “most legal actors preferred evaluative, rights-based mediators
to facilitative, interest-based mediators.”380  In a different study in-
volving family disputes, parents valued evaluative mediation
“when they discerned that the mediators understood their con-
cerns.381  Providing a legal evaluation affords some protection of a
pro se participant’s legal rights.  It provides legal information with-
out providing legal advice to one party to the detriment of another.
Even though it is not necessarily neutral because the evaluation
may benefit one party more than the other, it is impartial if prop-
erly employed.
Evaluative mediation, although widely used, is controversial in
the dispute resolution field.382  An evaluative mediator, as we have
seen above, “guides and advises the parties on the basis of his or
her expertise with a view to their reaching a settlement that ac-
cords with their legal rights and obligations, industry norms or
other objective standards.”383  When evaluating, a mediator “can
focus on a single issue or on the overall result in a case.”384
Whether evaluating more narrowly or more broadly, however,
many scholars deem evaluative mediation improper.  In their fre-
quently cited article, Professors Kimberlee Kovach and Lela Love
unequivocally state that “‘evaluative’ mediation is an oxymo-
ron.”385  In their view, evaluative mediation “jeopardizes neutrality
because a mediator’s assessment invariably favors one side over
another.”386  It also discourages more problem-solving dialogue
and promotes more debate dialogue, creating a more adversarial
environment.387  Evaluative mediation also can backfire, these
scholars point out, by vindicating one parties view and rendering
them less flexible for the remainder of the mediation.388  Among
the most concerning potential dangers of evaluative mediation,
380 TAMARA RELIS, PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION 207 (2009).
381 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real
Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573,
644 (2004).
382 Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
383 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 13.
384 Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
385 Kovach & Love, supra note 264, at 31.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
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however, is that it threatens party self-determination.389  This is es-
pecially true while working with pro se litigants who would be
highly susceptible to the one “impartial” expert in the room ana-
lyzing the strengths and weaknesses of their case.  The legitimate
fear, of course, is that “an evaluative mediator becomes an ‘ac-
tivist’—one who takes control of the mediation by advising parties
how to proceed.”390
Another legitimate concern of evaluative mediation is that,
once we set mediators up as judges of fairness, who checks them?
There is virtually no oversight of mediators in this country.391  Pres-
ently no state licenses mediators or provides any thorough review
of their credentials.392  Unlike the practice of law, few states have
ethical boards to which unhappy mediation participants can go to
lodge complaints about a mediator behavior.393  Moreover, media-
tion occurs under the veil of confidentiality, and while the medi-
ated agreement is usually not covered under that privilege, it is
frequently not available for public scrutiny.394  The concept of
“fair” is subjective.
Douglas Rosenthal’s study of personal injury cases in New
York demonstrates the highly subjective nature of “fair settle-
ments.”  Rosenthal chose sixty-one personal injury matters that
had been settled and then asked experienced personal injury law-
yers and one experienced insurance claims adjuster to review the
actual case file and assess the cases’ settlement value.395  Thus, the
study produced six values: the actual settlement amount and five
assessments of the value by experts.  The degree of variability
among the expert assessors was dramatic.396  In one case, which is
typical of the degree of variability, the five assessors, respectively,
valued the case as follows: $11,600, $7,500, $12,500, $20,000,
$15,000, and $3,000.397  The case actually settled for $5,000. Given
this outcome, it would not be outrageous to suggest that had the
389 Kovach & Love, supra note 264; Golann et al., supra note 274, at 27.
390 Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical
Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 479, 491 (2000).
391 Judith Meyer & Michael Leathes, How Mediators Can Obtain Professional Certification
and Thereby Elevate Their Profession: A Look at IMI’s Voluntary Credentialing Program, 63
DISP. RESOL. J. 22, 24 (2008).
392 Id.
393 Steven T. Peluso, Mediating the Licensing and Certification Labyrinth, 8 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 3 (2001).
394 Moffitt, supra note 244, at 172.
395 GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SETTLEMENTS 112–13 (1983).
396 Id.
397 Id.
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expert who valued the case at $20,000 been a mediator in this dis-
pute, a proposed settlement of $5,000 would be deemed self-evi-
dently “unfair.”  Yet, to the other expert who valued the case at
$3,000, the $5,000 settlement looks like a very good deal.  The ex-
perts’ assessment of value in another case with a particularly wide
spread of value spanned from a value of $2,000 to a value of
$30,000, where the actual settlement was $5,250.398  This case had a
coefficient of variability of 0.8950, which means that there was
nearly a 90% variation from the mean.399  The Rosenthal study
demonstrated the significant subjectivity inherent in the concept of
fairness and why propping up mediators as arbiters of substance
fairness of mediated agreements is suspect.
The real concern with evaluative mediation, however, is not
that mediators perform it, but that they frequently perform poorly.
In addressing best practices in the use of evaluative mediation,
Professors Golann and Aaron, make two recommendations worth
noting here because they go a long way to mitigate many of the
dangers that evaluative mediation poses to pro se litigants espe-
cially.  The first rule of good evaluation, they posit, is to “only eval-
uate when necessary.”400  This advice correctly takes into account
that even if done well, evaluation is an “inherently risky” and
highly directive settlement tool that implicates the dangers Profes-
sors Kovach and Love highlight.401  Before performing an evalua-
tion, the mediator should first try to settle the matter with
facilitative techniques that cede much more control over the dis-
pute to the parties, which is a significant goal of mediation in the
first place.402  Yet, it never occurs to many mediators not to evalu-
ate.  One common reason for this is that evaluation is the only way
that they know how to settle cases, having not been trained, or at
least not adequately trained, in facilitative mediation techniques.403
This implicates the quality of mediator training in this country,
which is beyond the scope of this Article,  But it is relevant to the
extent that many mediators, being lawyers, are highly informed
about legal analysis, but poorly informed on conflict analysis.404
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Golann et al., supra note 274, at 29.
401 Love et al., supra note 4, at 58. (explaining the “danger inherent in mediator
evaluations”).
402 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 83.
403 Michael T. Colatrella Jr., A “Lawyer For All Seasons”: The Lawyer As Conflict Manager,
49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 103–04 (2012).
404 Id. at 112.
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Thus, they believe, often wrongly, that the dispute is about a disa-
greement over law and/or facts.  In reality, the more significant ob-
stacle to settlement might be “the need to vent arguments and
emotions, poorly conducted positional bargaining, lack of informa-
tion or hidden psychological issues,” none of which are related to
the merits of the dispute or would benefit from an evaluation.405
To put it more succinctly, when all you have is a hammer every
problem looks like a nail.
The other invaluable piece of advice that the article provides is
that “an evaluation should be delayed as late in the mediation as
possible.”406  This has the benefit of mitigating many of the poten-
tial dangers of evaluation.  It allows information sharing and prob-
lem solving to be more fully developed, giving the parties a greater
voice in the mediation process and increasing the likelihood that
evaluation might not been needed at all.407  If you provide an eval-
uation shortly after the parties’ initial statements, as many
mediators do, you have deprived the parties the opportunity to re-
solve the matter without substantive direction and have perhaps
unnecessarily exposed them to all the potential dangers of such a
directive tactic.  Let us explore how the use of evaluation might
work in practice to better inform party decision-making.
Section 1983 Prisoner Civil Rights Claims is an area of litiga-
tion that is benefiting from increased use of mediation.408  A pris-
oner can file a Section 1983 claim in federal district court for
alleged violations of their federal constitutional or statutory rights
after exhausting their administrative process within their respective
correctional institutions.409  A typical prisoner Section 1983 claim
may involve physical abuse by prison personnel, destruction of
property, or improper medical care.410  As one might expect, most
prisoners are pro se litigants because they lack the income to hire
405 GOLANN, supra note 320, at 124–25.
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 John F. Murtha & Brett Bitzer, A New Pro Bono Opportunity with the District Court of
Nevada: Mediation of Prisoners § 1983 Civil Rights Claims, NEV. LAW. (July 2008).
409 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996); Steven W. Miller, Rethinking Prisoner Litigation: Shifting from
Qualified Immunity to Good Faith Defenses in § 1983 Lawsuits, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 829
(2009).
410 Michael S. Vaughn, Section 1983 Civil Liability of Prison Officials for Denying and Delay-
ing Medication and Drugs to Prison Inmates, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 55 (1995) (stating that
prison guards intentionally deny or delay access to medical care or intentionally interfere with
their treatment).
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an attorney.411  One of the obstacles in settling these types of dis-
putes is that the prisoner, because of their lack of legal expertise,
overestimate the likelihood of success at trial either because they
do not understand the proper legal standard or ignore relevant
rules of evidence that would make proving their claim, however
heartfelt, difficult.412  Medical claims are particularly difficult to
prove because the applicable legal standard under Section 1983
claims is “deliberate indifference to a known medical condition,”
not negligence, as a layperson might suppose.413  Therefore, a pris-
oner could not state a claim for injury caused by negligent failure
for a prison physician to diagnose diabetes.414  In such a case, the
prisoner would need to show that the prison physician knew about
diabetes and intentionally failed to provide treatment.415  If this
case is being mediated and the prisoner believes he has a valid
claim under a simple negligence standard, a mediator, after em-
ploying more facilitative tactics, could evaluate the claim by in-
forming him of the proper, more demanding legal standard and
then explore with plaintiff how this might affect his chances of suc-
cess.  This would help the prisoner make a more informed decision
about settlement.416  For example, let us assume that the state, as
the defendant, is offering $2,000 to settle the claim in mediation,
but the plaintiff is demanding a minimum of $100,000 to settle the
claim based upon reliance in a mistaken legal standard.  The medi-
ator’s evaluation could help the prisoner look more realistically at
the state’s offer, which might be fair, given that the prisoner’s claim
has little chance of success if the plaintiff has to prove deliberate
indifference.  This kind of evaluation, appropriately performed, can
help pro se litigants make informed decisions, without requiring
informed outcome consent.
Whether one believes evaluative mediation is an oxymoron or
a legitimate tool, it is a widely used strategy that is ethical.417  The
Model Standards permit evaluative mediation and make no distinc-
411 Candice K. Lee, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se Litigants’ Access to the Courts in
the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2003) (stating that most pro se litigants are
uneducated and poor).
412 Id. at 1283 (stating that pro se prisoner litigants lack resources to fully understand the
standards of law and misunderstand their claims).
413 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
414 Id.
415 See id.
416 See GOLANN, supra note 320, at 151–52.
417 RELIS, supra note 380, at 207.
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tion among mediation styles.418  Moreover, in practice, the distinc-
tion between facilitative and evaluative mediators is not black and
white.  Most mediators fall along a continuum of facilitative and
evaluative, making style labeling elusive.419  Evaluative mediators
often use facilitative elements and facilitative mediators often use
evaluative elements.420  Recent research demonstrates that some
mediators who categorize themselves as “facilitative,” either un-
consciously or consciously use evaluations by offering suggestions
or implied evaluation by body language.421  Thus, the line between
facilitation and evaluation is not always a clear one, but evaluative
techniques are at least an ethical path to promote informed out-
come consent.
Evaluative mediators can further promote informed consent
by assisting participants in fashioning enforceable and durable me-
diated terms and in helping them to understand their rights and
responsibilities under the mediated agreement whether or not they
are represented by counsel.  Neither party is served if a mediated
agreement is unenforceable, weak, or ambiguous.422  A common
goal of most mediators that benefits all participants is “to craft a
practical and durable agreement—and to protect against the esca-
lation of conflict that can come from non-compliance.”423  As al-
ways, the touchstone in evaluating the propriety of a mediator’s
assistance is impartiality.424
An excellent example of a mediator impartially assisting pro se
litigants in crafting an enforceable, durable and practical agree-
ment is recounted in mediator ethics advisory opinion from a fam-
ily dispute in New York.425  In this dispute, a father petitioned the
New York Family Court to obtain physical custody of his twelve-
year-old son and the court sent to case to mediation.426  During the
mediation, the mother agreed to relinquish psychical custody be-
cause she wished to honor her son’s wish to live with his father.427
Despite this agreement by the parties, one of the co-mediators
418 Id. at 198 (citing research that supports the proposition that “most legal actors preferred
evaluative, rights based mediations to facilitative, interest-based mediators”).
419 Levin, supra note 271, at 269.
420 RELIS, supra note 380, at 207.
421 Id.
422 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 278.
423 Id.
424 MODEL STANDARDS Standard II (2005).
425 New York State Mediator Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2009–02 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Ethics Opinion 2009–02].
426 Id. at 1.
427 Id.
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knew the financial child support arrangement between the parents
would be impacted if they son moved in with his father.428  The fact
that the pro se parties seemed to be unaware of this issue left the
mediators with a dilemma.429  On the one hand, the co-mediator
did not wish to cross the ethical line between providing legal infor-
mation and providing legal advice.430  On the other hand, the
mediators felt “strongly that they would be setting the parties up
for further conflict if the support issue is not clarified and an agree-
ment signed without being raised.”431  The co-mediators sought
ethical guidance from the New York Mediator Ethics Advisory
Committee (“the Committee”).432
In its advisory ethics opinion, the Committee addressed the
issue of the extent to which the co-mediators could appropriately
raise the support issue with the parties without giving legal advice
and violating the impartiality provision of the New York State me-
diator’s ethical code, a provision similar to the impartiality stan-
dard under the Model Standards.433  In a thoughtful opinion that
sought to balance party self-determination, quality process and im-
partiality, the Committee recommended the following course of ac-
tion to the mediators:
[Where] the mediator is aware of this information, and deems it
essential to the principles of self-determination and a quality
mediation process that the parties receive outside legal advice
on this issue prior to signing an agreement, then in joint session,
as part of reality testing the enforceability of the agreement, the
mediator should: (1) give the parties the legal information in
his\her possession; and (2) recommend that the parties consult
outside counsel for legal advice about their specific case.434
428 Id.
429 See id.
430 Id.
431 Ethics Opinion 2009–02, supra note 425, at 1.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 4–5; Standards of Conduct for New York State Community Dispute Resolution
Center Mediators Standard II (2005) (The New York impartiality ethical rule states that “a me-
diator shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and shall avoid conduct that gives the
appearance of partiality toward or prejudice against a party. Impartiality means freedom from
favoritism or prejudice in word, action or appearance.”)  The standards can be found at https://
www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Publications/Info_for_Programs/
Standards_of_Conduct_CDRC_Mediators.pdf.
434 Ethics Opinion 2009–02, supra note 425, at 2 (The Committee also stated that the media-
tor should “emphasize that (s)he is not acting as any party’s attorney and cannot dispense legal
advice specific to the case.”).
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The Committee found that the “potential link between custody and
support appears to constitute substantial information” that would
undermine that type of informed decision-making and quality pro-
cess that mediators are bound to promote under party self-determi-
nation.435  Wisely, however, the committee acknowledged that
neither of these important mediation values should trump the
equally important mediation value of impartiality.436  Thus, the
Committee advised the mediators to raise the issue generally
before the agreement was signed, but nothing more.437  The Com-
mittee explained, “the mediator may relay general legal informa-
tion regarding custody and support in joint session with the parties,
as part of reality testing the enforceability of the dispute.”438  The
Committee further advised that “[t]o avoid favoring one party over
another, such reality testing could be done by sharing the media-
tor’s general understanding that the custody decisions may affect
support, or by asking whether the parties are aware of any laws or
precedents that might impact support in the event of a custody
change.”439  After raising the issue, the mediator, the committee
stated, should then recommend that the parties seek legal counsel
on the issue.440  Importantly, the Committee emphasized that
mediators had no obligation to know the law.441  In other words,
mediators did not have a duty of informed outcome consent.442
Only if the mediator knows the law and deems it “substantial infor-
mation” necessary to promote self-determination and a quality
process for both parties, does a mediator have a duty to raise the
issue.443
This ethics opinion demonstrates that mediators absent a duty
of informed outcome consent can still assist pro se participants in
understanding the consequences of their agreements and, in some
cases, help them to avoid bad settlement choices.  To help parties
to craft durable and practical agreements, however, the important
mediation protections of self-determination, quality process, and
impartiality should extend only so far as they do not subordinate
435 Id. at 3.
436 See id at 4–5.
437 Id. at 2.
438 Id. at 4–5.
439 Id.
440 Ethics Opinion 2009–02, supra note 425.
441 Id. at 1.
442 See id. at 2.
443 Id. at 1–2.
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one other.  To do otherwise undermines and distorts the mediation
process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Mediators should do all in their power to assist pro se litigants
in overcoming the many obstacles that they face in pursuing their
legal rights and making wise settlement decisions.  But they must
discharge this duty while honoring their other ethical obligations.
Mediators cannot be required to obtain informed outcome consent
from pro se participants.  To do this, they would in many instances
need to act as legal advisors and counselors to unrepresented par-
ties, and this behavior would violate their duty of impartiality, a
core mediation value that should not be compromised.  Mediators
should strive to achieve fair agreements, but they must do so by
conducting a fair procedure.  “Mediation,” as has been said,
“chooses to stand in connection to all sides for justice’s sake.”444
To further promote fair procedure, the law should require
mediators to obtain informed participation consent.  Mediation
participants should be informed about the nature of the process in
which they are to engage because mediation is practiced in numer-
ous styles, with each style possessing different associated benefits
and risks.  Mediators can ethically explain the nature of the media-
tion process and the benefits and risks associated with their partic-
ular style of mediation because they can do so while being
impartial.  Such an explanation does not require them to treat the
parties substantially differently, as is the case with informed out-
come consent.  Moreover, understanding the risks and benefits of a
mediation process when participants enter into it will help partici-
pants to make wiser choices about the future of their dispute.
As this Article has explored, mediators already possess consid-
erable ability to improve informed decision-making for pro se me-
diation participants within the current ethical framework.  This
includes facilitative techniques that help parties recognize impor-
tant factual gaps and other strategies to increase the participant’s
information base upon which he or she will make settlement deci-
sions.  Mediators also can assist parties to more objectively assess
that information once collected by helping them to avoid common
decision-making traps like selective perception and advocacy bias.
444 JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS
CULTURES 14 (1995).
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Mediators can further aid parties by highlighting gaps in their legal
analysis through both facilitative and evaluative methods.  In ex-
treme circumstances, mediators can even offer legal opinions and
legal information relevant to the dispute as long as they do so im-
partially and in the services of all participants.
Of course, mediators do much more to help parties to better
understand the circumstances of their dispute than has been ex-
plored in this Article.  Mediators improve parties’ communication
process by helping them communicate more accurately, compre-
hensively and appropriately.445  They act as communication traffic
cops so that parties can have the opportunity to communicate their
interests, arguments and claims.446  Moreover, if necessary, they
can act as a buffer by keeping parties separate to mitigate the
power imbalances that can occur when a more domineering party,
wittingly or unwittingly, attempts to use intimidation tactics to ob-
tain the advantage in the negotiation.447
Mediators do more still, in that they help to overlay a problem
solving process onto a stalled negotiation, which also enhances par-
ticipant informed decision-making.448  This process has been called
“high quality consent” by Professor John Lande, and includes help-
ing participants to identify “goals and interests,” explore “options
for satisfying those interests,” and selection of options for careful
“evaluation” as a potential solution.449  As part of this problem
solving process, mediators can also help parties more thoroughly
understand the relevant legal principles that affect their dispute.
Although mediators cannot, and should not, provide the “robust”
form of informed outcome consent for which some scholars argue,
the assistance they ethically can provide is nevertheless significant
and meaningful.450
445 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 115.
446 FRENKEL ET AL., supra note 18, at 298.
447 BOULLE ET AL., supra note 17, at 106–07.
448 Id. at 61–62.
449 Professor Lande’s “high quality consent” includes seven factors in total.  They are as fol-
lows: “(1) explicit identification of the principals’ goals and interests, (2) explicit identification of
Plausible options for satisfying these interests, (3) the principals’ explicit selection of options for
evaluation, (4) careful consideration of these options, (5) mediator’s restraint in pressuring prin-
cipals to accept particular substantive options, (6) limitation on use of time pressure, and (7)
conformation of principals’ consent to select options.” John Lande, How Will Lawyering and
Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 839, 869 (1997).
450 A different issue of particular importance to recognize, but one beyond the scope of this
Article, is the existence of studies that find that minorities, who make up a significant percentage
of pro se litigants, often fare worse in mediation than non-minorities because of mediator
prejudice.  Sharon Press, Court-Connected Mediation and Minorities: A Report Card, 39 CAP. U.
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L. REV. 819, 828 (2011).  The data is complex and sometimes conflicting, leaving the more spe-
cific reasons why minorities’ monetary settlements are not as high as their non-minority counter-
parts open to debate. Id. at 828–31.  Solutions to this problem have not focused on improving
informed consent, but rather have mostly focused on improving the way mediators are assigned
to disputes, diversity of the mediator pools, and quality of mediator training. Id. at 840–43.
